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 i 
Abstract 
 
 
 My master’s thesis is a Quinean critique of David Chalmers’ 
semantic theory, epistemic two-dimensional semantics.  I criticize his 
epistemic two-dimensional semantics by providing a Quinean critique of his 
assumption that there is clear distinction between the a priori and the a 
posteriori, which plays a fundamental role in constructing his semantic 
theory. 
 In chapter 1, I discuss Chalmers’ epistemic two-dimensional 
semantics, which is intended as a vindication of Fregean semantics, and the 
role of the a priori in the vindication.  I argue that it is paramount to define 
an expression’s primary intension, which plays Fregean sense roles, and that 
the definition of primary intensions fundamentally depends on the 
assumption that there is the a priori/a posteriori distinction.  
 In chapter 2, I examine Chalmers’ response to Quine’s attack on the 
a priori.  According to Chalmers’ understanding of Quine’s attack, Quine 
argues that every sentence is revisable (revisability), and thus there is no 
distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori.  Against Quine’s 
argument, Chalmers attempts to draw the principled distinction between 
revisability involving conceptual change and the one without conceptual 
change.  He then argues that revisability is consistent with the a priori/a 
posteriori distinction, and thus Quine’s attack on the a priori fails.  
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 In chapter 3, I scrutinize Quine’s critique of Carnap’s a priori 
relative to a language in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”.  I argue that 
Carnapian distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori is repudiated 
by two Quinean doctrines, epistemological holism and underdetermination 
of theory by evidence.  
 In chapter 4, I will provide a Quinean critique of Chalmers’ 
rejoinder to Quine’s attack on the a priori and of Chalmers’ semantic theory.  
The two Quinean doctrines imply that there is no distinction between the a 
priori and the a posteriori.  On the basis of this implication, I argue that 
Chalmers’ rejoinder fails and moreover his semantic theory would be 
repudiated.     
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 In my master’s thesis, I will critically investigate David Chalmers’ 
distinctive semantic theory, epistemic two-dimensional semantics, in light of 
a Quinean critique of the a priori.  In other words, my thesis will provide a 
Quinean critique of the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori, 
which plays a fundamental role in constructing Chalmers’ semantic theory, 
and thereby will criticize his semantic theory.   
 Chalmers (Chalmers 2002a, 2002b, 2004, 2006, Chalmers and 
Jackson 2001) advocates epistemic two-dimensional semantics, according to 
which every expression has two kinds of intension: one is the familiar post-
Kripkean intension, what he calls ‘secondary intension’, which would be 
understood as a function from possible worlds considered as counterfactual 
to extensions of an expression; the other is an epistemic intension, what he 
calls ‘primary intension’, which would be understood as a function from 
possible worlds considered as actual to extensions of an expression. 
 The most distinctive claim of Chalmers’ semantic theory is that 
every expression has a primary intension, which is strongly tied to cognitive 
significance and moreover determines the extension in each possible world 
considered as actual.  In this respect, the primary intension restores the 
Fregean sense, and thus his semantic theory is regarded as a philosophical 
movement to defend Fregean semantics.  Therefore, it is crucially 
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important for Chalmers to define and defend primary intension.  In his 
recent book, Constructing the World (2002), Chalmers actually makes an 
attempt to provide a foundation in defining primary intensions on the basis 
of the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori. 
However, W. V. O. Quine, in his paper, “Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism” (1953; 1980), powerfully argues against the distinction 
between the a priori and the a posteriori.  Since the a priori/a posteriori 
distinction is indispensable in constructing his epistemic two-dimensional 
semantics, Chalmers (2011, 2012) makes an attempt to refute Quine’s 
argument against the distinction.  He understands Quine’s argument as 
arguing that no sentence is immune to revision (revisability); but a priori 
sentences are unrevisable if they exist; therefore, there is no a priori 
sentence.  To rebut the argument, Chalmers distinguishes revisability 
involving conceptual change from the one without conceptual change, and 
then, on the basis of this distinction, insists that there are a priori sentences 
are revisable 
However, I will argue that Chalmers’ argument against Quine’s 
attack on the a priori is repudiated by two Quinean doctrines, 
epistemological holism and underdetermination of theory by evidence, 
which are found in “Two Dogmas”.  Epistemological holism claims that 
every sentence has cognitive significance only in a theory, taken as a whole, 
which explains our sense-experience about the world better than other 
theories.  Underdetermination of theory by experience claims that a 
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uniquely best theory is not determined solely by evidence.  These two 
doctrines imply that every sentence would be justified in the same way, or 
every sentence would be justified when it is a part of a theory, which 
successfully explains our sense-experience about the world better than any 
rival theory.  From this, it follows that there is no distinction between the a 
priori and the a posteriori.  The argument, which is constructed from the 
two Quinean doctrines, refutes Chalmers’ response to Quine’s attack on the 
a priori, thereby threatening Chalmers’ philosophical project in defending 
Fregean semantics. 
 My master’s thesis has four chapters.  In chapter 1, I will discuss 
Chalmers’ epistemic two-dimensional semantics and the role of the a priori 
in his semantics.  In our discussion, we will come to know that Chalmers’ 
epistemic two-dimensional semantics is a semantic theory, which aims to 
defend Fregean semantics.  In Chalmers’ project, it is paramount to define 
an expression’s primary intension, which plays a role both in cognition and 
in determining the extension of the expression.  Our discussion also reveals 
that Chalmers’ work to define primary intensions fundamentally depends on 
the assumption that there is the a priori which is clearly distinguished from 
the a posteriori.   
 In chapter 2, I will examine Chalmers’ response to Quine’s attack 
on the a priori.  Quine (1953; 1980) argues against the a priori/a posteriori 
distinction.  Chalmers understands Quine’s attack on the a priori as an 
argument that a priori sentences should be unrevisable while a posteriori 
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sentences are revisable; but no sentence is immune to revision; therefore 
there is no distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori.  Against 
Quine’s attack, Chalmers attempts to draw the principled distinction 
between revisability involving conceptual change and the one without 
conceptual change.  He then argues that revisability involving conceptual 
change is consistent with the distinction between the a priori and the a 
posteriori, and thus Quine’s argument from revisability fails.  
 In chapter 3, I will scrutinize Quine’s critique of the a priori in 
“Two Dogmas”.  I will especially focus on Quine’s critique of Carnap’s 
relativized a priori.  In the scrutiny, we will come to know that the two 
doctrines, epistemological holism and underdetermination of theory by 
evidence, together imply that there is no a priori/a posteriori distinction.  
The discussion of this chapter provides the essential elements needed to 
refute Chalmers’ argument in chapter 2. 
 In Chapter 4, I will provide a Quinean critique of Chalmers’ 
response to Quine’s attack on the a priori and of Chalmers’ epistemic two-
dimensional semantics.  Chalmers argues that the principled distinction 
between revisability involving conceptual change and the one without 
conceptual change can be drawn, and the distinction is consistent with the a 
priori/a posteriori distinction.  But I will argue that the two Quinean 
doctrines, epistemological holism and underdetermination of theory by 
evidence, together imply that there is no distinction between revisability 
involving conceptual change and the one without conceptual change, and 
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thus there is no distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori.  The 
two Quinean doctrines also threaten Chalmers’ semantic theory itself 
because his semantic theory is fundamentally grounded in the a priori/a 
posteriori distinction.     
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Chapter 1 
 Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics and the 
A Priori 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 This chapter is an investigation of Chalmers’ epistemic two-
dimensional semantics, a version of two-dimensional semantics.  Two-
dimensional semantics, as a purely formal framework, is a species of 
possible world semantics.  In contrast with the standard possible world 
semantics, which assigns an extension or truth-value to a linguistic 
expression relative to one possible world parameter, two-dimensional 
semantics assigns an extension or truth-value, to a linguistic expression 
relative to two possible world parameters.  
 Different kinds of two-dimensional semantics have been suggested 
according to different interpretations of two possible world parameters for 
different explanatory purposes.1  Among them, Chalmers’ epistemic two-
                                            
1 David Kaplan and some logicians have developed two-dimensional semantics, 
which would be used to analyze restricted expressions such as indexical and 
operators in tense and modal logic.  Kaplan (1977) used two dimensional 
framework to account for conventional rules governing indexical and 
demonstrative such as ‘I’, ‘that’, ‘here’ which refer to different things depending on 
the contexts of utterance of the expression.  Some logicians working on tense and 
modal logic suggested two-dimensional semantics, which would be used to analyze 
the uses of logical operators such as ‘now’, ‘actually, and ‘necessarily’ (Vlach, F. 
1973, Kamp, H. 1971, Å qvist, L. 1973, Segerberg, K. 1973, van Frasssen, B. 1977).  
Robert Stalnaker (1978, 2004) has developed another sort of two-dimensional 
semantics which can explain assertion and its relation with context.  That is, his 
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dimensional semantics interprets the two possible world parameters as 
epistemic possible worlds and metaphysical possible worlds.  But we 
should note that this distinction does not imply that there are two kinds of 
possible worlds.  Chalmers’ distinction rather corresponds to the two 
different ways of considering the same set of possible worlds as actual and 
as counterfactual.  In accordance with these two ways of considering 
possible worlds, Chalmers divides a linguistic expression’s intension into 
epistemic intension, what he calls ‘primary intension’, and metaphysical 
intension, what he calls ‘secondary intension’.  An expression’s secondary 
intension is defined as a function from possible worlds considered as 
counterfactual to its extensions; an expression’s primary intension is defined 
as a function from possible worlds considered as actual to its extension.  
 An expression’s primary intension is an aspect of meaning, which is 
knowable a priori for a subject solely by analyzing her concept of the 
expression, and moreover determines the expression’s extension in each 
possible world considered as actual.  In this sense, a primary intension is 
regarded as a sort of meaning in a Fregean sense, and thus Chalmers’ 
epistemic two-dimensional semantics would be regarded as a vindication of 
Fregean semantics.  
                                                                                                               
two-dimensional semantics aims to provide a pragmatic account of assertion about 
contingent information by uttering sentences such as ‘George Orwell is Eric Blair’ 
which semantically expresses necessary true propositions.  His two-dimensional 
semantics covers all kinds of expressions, and in this respect, his theory is not 
different from Chalmers’ two-dimensional semantics.  But Stalnaker’s theory is 
conclusively different from Chalmers’ theory in the way that his theory is not 
committed to a sort of meaning which is knowable a priori which Chalmers’ theory 
is committed to.   
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 In order for primary intensions to play Fregean sense-roles, i.e., 
roles in cognition and in determining extension, the intensions are to be 
constructed from scenarios representing epistemic possibilities that are 
highly specific hypotheses about the world, considered as actual, which are 
not ruled out a priori for any rational subject.  
 Chalmers, in Constructing the World (2012), attempts to construct 
primary intensions which play Fregean sense-roles by vindicating the A 
Priori Scrutability thesis which states that there is a very limited class of 
true sentences such that for any true sentence S, any subject, through 
idealized reasoning, would be in a position to know S a priori from the 
limited class.   
 This chapter is organized as follows.  First, I will discuss 
Chalmers’ motivation for his epistemic two-dimensional semantics, 
especially in philosophy of language.  In the discussion, we will come to 
know that his epistemic two-dimensional semantics aims to defend Fregean 
semantics.  In section 3, I will scrutinize Chalmers’ A Priori Scrutability 
thesis, which serves as a foundation for his semantic theory.  Our 
discussion in this chapter will show that Chalmers’ assumption that there is 
a clear distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori plays a crucially 
important role in constructing his epistemic two-dimensional semantics.  
 
2. Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics as Fregean 
Semantics  
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 Chalmers’ epistemic two-dimensional semantics aims to defend 
Fregean Semantics.  But, why does Chalmers aim to defend Fregean 
semantics?  It would be helpful to consider Millian-Russellian semantics, 
which claims that an expression’s meaning is exhausted by its extension. 
(Mill 1843, Salmon 1986)  Gottlob Frege, in his paper, “Über Sinn und 
Bedeutung” (1892), refutes Millian-Russellian Semantics.  It is intuitively 
plausible that one believes that the sentence ‘George Orwell is George 
Orwell’ is true while at the same time believing that the sentence ‘George 
Orwell is Eric Blair’ is false, even though ‘George Orwell’ and ‘Eric Blair’ 
refer to the same person, George Orwell.  From this, we can infer either the 
two identity sentences are not determined as being true or false solely by 
meanings of its constituents, or there is an aspect of meaning which reflects 
our cognitive significance of expressions.  But our knowledge that ‘George 
Orwell is Eric Blair’ intuitively seems to depend on what we mean by 
‘George Orwell’ and by ‘Eric Blair’.  Frege thus concluded that an 
expression has an epistemic meaning, what he calls ‘sense’ as well as an 
extension, what he calls ‘reference’.  Fregean senses, however, have been 
criticized by many contemporary philosophers, especially by meaning 
externalists.  On the other hand, Chalmers thinks that ‘Frege was closer to 
the truth’ (Chalmers 2002, p.135).  He thus makes an attempt to define 
epistemic meaning- which serves the roles of Fregean senses.   
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2.1. The Golden Triangle between Reason, Modality and 
Meaning  
 An expression’s extension, as we saw, in general, fails to capture a 
subject’s cognitive significance of the expression.  For example, even 
though ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ have the same extension, Venus, the 
sentence ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ obviously seems to be cognitively trivial, 
while the sentence ‘Hesperus is phosphorus’ would be cognitively valuable.  
Frege thus insisted that an expression has a sense which is constitutively 
connected with cognitive significance. Thus, according to Frege, two 
expressions are cognitively distinct if and only if they have different senses.  
In this way, he explained why two identity sentences, ‘a=a’ and ‘a=b’, are 
cognitively different even though ‘a’ and ‘b’ are coextensive.  Chalmers 
formulates this idea in the following manner: 
 
‘Fregean Thesis: Two expressions ‘A’ and ‘B’ have the 
same senses iff ‘A≡B’ is cognitively insignificant.’2 
(Chalmers 2004, p. 155) 
 
Fregean thesis provides an account of meaning which reflects cognitive 
significance of an expression.  But he said very little about both senses and 
cognitive significances.  
 Rudolf Carnap (1947) attempted to account what Fregean senses are, 
and how they behave.  In other words, he suggested a possible world 
                                            
2 Here, ‘A≡B’ means that ‘A’ and ‘B’ have the same extension.  Thus, ‘A≡B’ will 
be identity sentence, ‘A=B’, where ‘A’ and ‘B’ are names; ‘A≡B’ will be the 
material biconditional sentence, ‘A iff B’, where ‘A’ and ‘B’ are sentences; and so 
on.   
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semantics as an explication of Fregean senses.  His strategy is to define the 
notion of intension in terms of clear notions of extension and of modality in 
such a way that intensions behave like Fregean senses.  Carnap defines an 
expression’s intension as a function from possible cases to extensions.  
Intuitively, intensions defined in this way seem to behave in a Fregean sense.  
Let’s consider two expressions ‘the highest mountain in the world’ and ‘Mt. 
Everest’.  These two expressions refer to the same extension, Mt. Everest, 
but their cognitive values are evidently different.  Thus, according to the 
Fregean thesis, they have different senses.  In the actual world, Mt. Everest 
is the highest mountain in the world, and thus ‘Mt. Everest’ and the highest 
mountain in the world’ have the same extension.  But they are not 
necessarily coextensive.  For if K2, not Mt. Everest, had been the highest 
mountain in the world, then ‘the highest mountain in the world’ would not 
have referred to Mt. Everest but K2.  Then, from Carnap’s possible world 
semantics, it follows that ‘Mt. Everest’ and ‘the highest mountain in the 
world’ do not stand for the same extension in every possible cases, and thus 
they have different intensions.  This is formulated by Chalmers in the 
following manner:  
 
‘Carnapian Thesis: ‘A’ and ‘B’ have the same intension iff 
‘A≡B’ is necessary.’ 
(Chalmers 2004, p. 157) 
 
Recall that Carnap’s definition of intensions is intended as an explication of 
Fregean senses.  As Fregean sense is the meaning which is constitutively 
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connected to reason, intensions should be also constitutively connected to 
reason.  But the Carnapian thesis only warrants the connection between 
intension and modality.  The thesis does not warrant the connection 
between intensions and reason, which is required for explication of Fregean 
sense.  Kant’s claim that all necessary truths are knowable a priori, and 
vice versa, would be helpful for Carnap’s purpose.  Kant’s claim can be 
formulated as follows: 
 
‘Kantian Thesis: A sentence S is necessary iff S is 
knowable a priori.’ 
(Chalmers 2004, p. 157) 
 
Now we have arrived at Carnap’s explication of sense.  The Carnapian 
thesis, together with the Kantian thesis, implies the following thesis, which 
claims that there is a close connection between reason, modality, and 
meaning: 
 
‘Neo-Fregean Thesis: Two expressions ‘A’ and ‘B’ have 
the same intension iff ‘A≡B’ is a priori.’ 
(Chalmers 2004, p. 157) 
 
Chalmers thinks that the thesis above provides an explication of Fregean 
sense.  The Fregean thesis draws upon elusive notions, sense and cognitive 
significance.  In contrast, according to Chalmers, the Neo-Fregean thesis 
depends upon clear notions than the notions of sense and cognitive 
significance.  
 Many philosophers have thought that cognitive (in)significance is 
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closely related with the a priori (a posteriori).  That is, they have thought 
that if a sentence is cognitively insignificant for a subject, then the sentence 
is knowable a priori for the subject, and if a sentence is cognitively 
significant for a subject, then the sentence is knowable a posteriori for the 
subject.3  Chalmers agrees with this thought, and moreover he thinks that 
apriority is a clear notion so that the a priori/a posteriori distinction is also 
clear.  Unlike the notion of cognitive (in)significance, we can characterize 
a priori knowledge as being acquired without any dependence on sense-
experience, and a posteriori knowledge as being ultimately acquired from 
sense-experience.  Chalmers thus regards Carnap’s definition of intension 
in terms of modality, which is connected with apriority (the Neo-Fregean 
thesis) as an attempt to explicate Fregean senses.  He calls the connection 
between meaning (intension), modality and reason (apriority) which is 
stated by the Neo-Fregean thesis ‘the golden triangle’. 
 
2.2. Kripke’s Destruction of the Golden Triangle 
 There is an easily noticed difference between knowledge about 
mathematical and logical truths such as 2+2=4 and the law of the excluded 
middle, and other branches of knowledge such as knowledge that water = 
H2O.  Philosophers in general have thought that the former is about 
                                            
3 Frege, however, thought that there are cognitively significant sentences among a 
priori sentences.  In other words, he believed that there are many logical and 
mathematical sentences, such as Fermat’s Last Theorem, which are not cognitively 
trivial but valuable, even though they are knowable a priori.  Frege thus thought 
that the fact a sentence is cognitively significant for a subject does not imply that 
the sentence is not knowable a priori for the subject.   
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necessary truths while the latter is about contingent truths.  But, how do we 
acquire knowledge about necessary truths?  Many philosophers have 
claimed that if there are necessary truths, then our knowledge about them 
are acquired without any dependence on sense-experience.  Kant nicely 
stated this claim as follows: all necessary truths are knowable a priori, and 
vice versa (the Kantian thesis).  Carnap’s explication of sense, i.e. the Neo-
Fregean thesis, depends on the Kantian thesis, which was not doubt at the 
time.  But Kripke (1980) argues that there are some identity sentences, 
which are necessary but knowable a posteriori.  His claim is based upon 
his thesis, which states that names and natural kind terms are rigid 
designators that pick out the same extension in every possible world in 
which the extension exists.  Let’s consider two expressions, ‘water’ and 
‘H2O’.  Since the two expressions are natural kind terms, according to 
Kripke, they pick out H2O in every possible world.  From this, it follows 
that ‘Water is H2O’ is necessary true even though the sentence expresses an 
empirical fact.  
 The Neo-Fregean thesis, as we saw, depends upon the Kantian 
thesis.  Kripke’s argument thus would be understood to refute the Kantian 
thesis, and thereby to disprove the Neo-Fregean thesis.  According to 
Kripke, two natural terms, ‘water’ and ‘H2O’, have the same extension in 
every possible world, so that they have the same intension; therefore ‘Water 
is H2O’ is necessarily true.  But, if the Neo-Fregean thesis is true, then 
‘Water is H2O’ is to be knowable a priori, even if the sentence is evidently 
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knowable a posteriori.  Therefore, it seems to follow that the Neo-Fregean 
thesis is disproved.  
 
2.3. Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics and the Golden 
Triangle  
 Kripke may be considered to have destroyed the golden triangle by 
cutting the Kantian link between modality and reason.  But he kept intact 
the connection of meaning and modality.  Thus, philosophers who are 
sympathetic to Kripke have suggested that an expression’s intension is a 
function from possible worlds to extensions (Kripkean intension).  
Chalmers aims to restore the golden triangle, but he does not deny the 
existence of Kripkean intensions.  He thus suggests a semantic theory that 
satisfies the Neo-Fregean thesis, compatible with Kripkean intension.  His 
core idea is that there are not only metaphysical possibilities which 
correspond to ways of considering the set of possible worlds as 
counterfactual, but also epistemic possibilities which corresponds to ways of 
considering the same set of possible worlds as actual.  He then defines two 
kinds of intension, according to the two kinds of ways of considering 
possible worlds.  First, he defines an expression’s epistemic intension, 
what he calls ‘primary intension’, as a function from possible worlds 
considered as actual to the expression’s extensions.  Next, he defines an 
expression’s Kripkean intension, what he calls ‘secondary intension’, as a 
function from possible worlds considered as counterfactual to extensions of 
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the expression.  
 Chalmers argues that the existence of primary intensions vindicates 
the golden triangle between meaning (primary intension), modality 
(epistemic possibilities) and reason (apriority).  The restoration of the 
golden triangle depends on the following thesis: 
 
Core Thesis: For any sentence S, S is a priori iff S has a 
necessary primary intension, that is, S is true in every 
epistemic possibility.4  
 
Let’s suppose that the Core thesis holds.  Then for any sentence S, S has 
one of the following structures: ‘All As are Bs, and vice versa’, where ‘A’ 
and ‘B’ are predicates, or ‘a is identical to b’, where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are names, 
or ‘T iff U’, where ‘T’ and ‘U’ are sentences.  Then, from the 
compositionality of meaning which states that the meaning of a complex 
expression is functionally determined by its structure and meaning of its 
constituents, we get the following thesis: 
 
Neo-Fregean Thesis (Chalmers version): Two 
expressions ‘A’ and ‘B’ have the same primary intension iff 
‘A≡B’ is a priori.5 
 
Let’s consider ‘4+6=1+9’ which evidently seems to be a priori.  Suppose 
that the Core thesis is true.  Then ‘4+6=1+9’ has a necessary primary 
intension, and thus ‘4+6’ and ‘1+9’ have the same primary intension by the 
compositionality of meaning.  Then, it follows that the Neo-Fregean thesis 
                                            
4 Cf. Chalmers, “Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics”, p. 165 
5 Cf. Chalmers, “Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics”, p. 166 
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is true.  Chalmers thus needs to vindicate the Core thesis in constructing 
his epistemic two-dimensional semantics.   
 
3. A Priori Scrutability Thesis: A Foundational Thesis for 
Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics 
 In the previous section, we saw that for Chalmers it is crucially 
important to vindicate the Core thesis, and in order to vindicate the Core 
thesis, he needs to define primary intensions in terms of apriority.  In other 
words, he needs to define primary intensions in scenarios which represent 
epistemic possibilities, i.e. highly specific hypotheses about the worlds 
considered as actual that are not excluded a priori for any rational subject.  
Chalmers (2012) in fact sets out foundational works for such a definition of 
primary intensions.  That is, he attempts to demonstrate the A Priori 
Scrutability thesis, which claims that there is a scenario such that for any 
true sentence S, a subject, through idealized reasoning, would be in a 
position to know a priori, the conditional that if the sentences of the 
scenario obtain, then S. 
 
3.1. Reviving the Aufbau-like Project: A Priori Scrutability  
 Chalmers, in Constructing the World (2012), attempts to revive an 
Aufbau-like project.  He says,  
 
In many ways, Carnap is the hero of this book.  Like the 
other twentieth-century logical empiricists, he is often 
dismissed as a proponent of a failed research program.  
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But I am inclined to think that Carnap was fundamentally 
right more often than he was fundamentally wrong.  I do 
not think that he was right about everything, but I think that 
many of his ideas have been underappreciated.  So one 
might see this project, in part, as aiming for a sort of 
vindication.   
(Chalmers 2012, ⅹⅶ) 
 
Chalmers thinks that Carnap was fundamentally right in the sense that he 
argued for a sort of Scrutability thesis that every truth is scrutable from a 
class of basic truths.  Chalmers, however, disagrees with Carnap on 1) 
which kinds of truths are basic and 2) how every truth is scrutable from 
basic truths.   
 Chalmers understands Carnap’s project in Der Logische Aufbau der 
Welt (1967) as a sort of construction project, which claims that all concepts 
deployed in knowledge can be constructed from the single primitive concept 
of the relation of phenomenal similarity, which holds among immediately 
given experiences, along with logical truths. 6   Equivalently, this 
construction project can be understood as the following form of 
reductionism: every concept employed in knowledge is reducible, by the aid 
of logic, to the single primitive concept of the relation of phenomenal 
similarity, holding among immediate experiences.  Carnap accepted the 
result of Gestalt psychology about immediately given experience, as a result, 
he counted what is immediately given as the total experience of one moment.  
Hence, he thought of phenomenal similarity as a sort of relation between 
                                            
6 See Chalmers, Constructing the World, p.3.  
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total experiences that a subject had at different times.   
 We need to note that Carnap’s reduction or construction program 
requires a sort of eliminative definition.  Carnap in fact says, ‘An object (or 
concept) is said to be reducible to one or more objects if all statements about 
it can be transformable into statements about these other objects’ (Carnap 
1967, p.6).  Carnap’s construction project thus can be defined in terms of 
basic concepts, that is, of logical concepts and phenomenal concepts.  
Chalmers thus claims that Carnap in the Aufbau was committed to the 
following thesis:  
 
Definability: There is a compact class of primitive 
expressions such that every expression is definable in terms 
of expressions of the compact class.78 
 
The above thesis allows us to connect sentences in different words, and 
thereby to get the following Scrutability thesis: 
 
Definability Scrutability: There is a compact class such 
that all true sentences are knowable, via adequate definition 
sentences, form the compact class.9 
 
Then, Carnap’s project in the Aufbau can be understood to vindicate the 
following form of the Definability Scrutability thesis: 
 
Carnapian Scrutability: All true sentences are in principle 
knowable, via adequate definition sentences, from 
                                            
7 See Chalmers, Constructing the World, p. 3.  
8 Chalmers means ‘a compact class’ as a class which involves only a small number 
of expressions, and thus can avoid all trivial inferences. 
9 See Chalmers, Constructing the World, p. 5.  
 
 20 
phenomenal and logical true sentences.10 
 
Many philosophers have criticized the Carnapian Scrutability thesis. 11 
Chalmers also does not agree with the thesis itself because of the following 
reasons: first, he thinks that the class of logical truths and phenomenal truths 
cannot be compact, or that such truths are not enough to infer all truths even 
for an idealized reasoner; second, he thinks that the Carnapian method of 
scrutability, which requires definitions, is too strong.  But he thinks the 
idea that all truths are scrutable from basic truths is fundamentally right.  
He thus attempts to revise the Carnapian Scrutability thesis so that the 
revised Scrutability thesis can demonstrate that all knowledge about the 
world is reductively explained by basic truths about the world.12  He first 
expands the Carnapian basic truths into PQTI truths-P: physical truths, Q; 
phenomenal truths, T: ‘that’s all’ truths, I: indexical truths, in such a way 
that the resulting basic truths can do the work they need to do.  Next, he 
weakens the scrutability method by replacing ‘definitionally scrutable’ in 
the Carnapian Scrutability thesis into ‘a priori scrutable’.   Chalmers 
insists that the revised thesis can achieve Carnap’s aim in the Aufbau that all 
knowledge about the world can be reductively explained in terms of basic 
truths.  This revised thesis is the PQTI Scrutability thesis, which is one sort 
                                            
10 See Chalmers, Constructing the World, p. 6.  
11 There have been two kinds of criticisms to the Carnapian Scrutability thesis.  
The first argues that Carnapian basic truths cannot do what they need to do.  We 
can find this kind of criticism in Chisholm 1948, Goodman 1952, Newman 1928, 
and Quine 1953; 1980.  The second argues that the Carnapian method of 
scrutability is too strong.  This sort of criticism is found in Kripke 1980, Quine 
1953; 1980, Waismann 1945, and Wittgenstein 1953.  
12 See Chalmers, Constructing the World, pp. 7-12.  
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of the A Priori Scrutability thesis.  They can be formulated respectively as 
follows: 
 
A Priori Scrutability: There is a compact class such that 
for any truth S, any subject, through idealized reasoning, 
would be in a position to know, if every truth of that class 
obtains, then S, without any dependence on sense-
experience.13   
PQTI Scrutability: There is PQTI truths such that any 
subject, through idealized reasoning, would know a priori 
all truths from PQTI truths.14  
 
We understand and use many expressions very well, even though we 
in fact do not have any definition of the expressions.  For example, 
although ‘knowledge’ and ‘justice’ are not definable in terms of more 
primitive expressions, we usually understand and use the terms very 
well.  Thus, such cases would be a threat to the Definability 
Scrutability thesis, but Chalmers claims that the cases would not be a 
problem for the A Priori Scrutability thesis because the thesis does 
not rest on explicit conceptual analysis involving definitions.  He 
examines Gettier’s counter-example. 
 
Smith believes with justification that Jones owns a Ford. 
Smith also believes that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in 
Barcelona, where this belief is based solely on a valid 
inference from his belief that Jones owns a Ford.  Jones 
does not own a Ford, but as it happens, Brown is in 
Barcelona.    
(Chalmers 2012, p. 13) 
 
Let the above scenario be G, and ‘Smith knows that Jones owns a Ford or 
                                            
13 See Chalmers, Constructing the World, pp. 58-59. 
14 See Chalmers, Constructing the World, p. 22.  
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Brown is in Barcelona’ be K.  Given G, it seems obvious that almost any 
subject, with rational reasoning, would know that K is false.  However, if 
the Definability Scrutability thesis is true, then even a subject who can do 
idealized reasoning, should not be able to know that if G then ~K.  For G 
does not contain the term ‘know’ or its cognates, and thus there is no 
definition sentence about ‘know’.  But it seems obvious that any rational 
subject would infer that K is false from G.  From this, it follows that the 
Definability Scrutability thesis, including the Carnapian Scrutability thesis, 
is false.  On the other hand, the A Priori Scrutability thesis does not require 
explicit conceptual analysis.  Thus, the Gettier case would not be a threat 
to the A Priori Scrutability thesis because the thesis allows that a subject 
infer ~K from G, without further empirical information, even if there were 
no explicit analysis of the concept of ‘knowledge’.  
 Then, does Chalmers claim that the A Priori Scrutability thesis does 
not involve conceptual analysis at all?  That is, does he assert that 
conceptual analysis is not required for reductive explanations?  No, he just 
insists that explicit conceptual analysis is not necessarily required for 
reductive explanations, but he does not object to the idea that conceptual 
analysis is necessarily required for reductive explanations.  The A Priori 
Scrutability thesis in fact suggests the alternative model of conceptual 
analysis.  Chalmers, with Frank Jackson, actually suggested the alternative 
model of conceptual analysis as follows: 
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When given sufficient information about a hypothetical 
scenario, subjects are frequently in a position to identify the 
extension of a given concept, on reflection, under the 
hypothesis that the scenario in question obtains. […] What 
emerges as a result of this process may or may not be an 
explicit definition, but it will at least give useful 
information about the features in virtue of which a concept 
applies to the world. 
(Chalmers and Jackson 2001, p. 322) 
 
If something like this is right, then possession of a concept 
such as 'knowledge' or 'water' bestows a conditional ability 
to identify the concept's extension under a hypothetical 
epistemic possibility, given sufficient information about 
that epistemic possibility and sufficient reasoning.  That is, 
possession of these concepts in a sufficiently rational 
subject bestows an ability to evaluate certain conditionals 
of the form E → C where E contains sufficient 
information about an epistemic possibility and where C is a 
statement using the concept and characterizing its extension, 
for arbitrary epistemic possibilities.  And conceptual 
analysis often proceeds precisely by evaluating conditionals 
like these. 
(Chalmers and Jackson 2001: 324) 
 
In the above, Chalmers, with Jackson, argues that conditional analysis as a 
conditional ability to identify the extension of a given concept, under the 
assumption that sufficient information about a hypothetical epistemic 
possibility is given, is sufficient for a reductive explanation.  We need to 
note that their conceptual analysis should be carried out a priori, and this 
requires that an analyzed concept is knowable a priori.  Let’s consider the 
following two reductive explanations for water that Chalmers and Jackson 
can provide: 
 
[Earth] 
(P1) 60 percent of the Earth is covered by H2O. 
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(P2) H2O = the waterish stuff 
(P3) Water = the waterish stuff [conceptual analysis] 
(C1) Therefore, H2O = water                              
(C2) Therefore, 60 percent of the Earth is covered by water.     
 
[Twin Earth] 
(P1) 60 percent of the Twin Earth is covered by XYZ. 
(P2) XYZ = the waterish stuff 
(P3) Water = the waterish stuff [conceptual analysis] 
(C1) Therefore, XYZ = water                             
(C2) Therefore, 60 percent of the Twin Earth is covered by water.  
 
The two arguments above show that C1, an ordinary macroscopic truth, is a 
priori scrutable from the conjunctions of the following truths: P1, an 
empirical micro-physical truth, P2, an a priori truth, and P3, an empirical 
macro-physical truth.  P2 plays a crucial role in the two arguments.  C2 is 
a priori scrutable from given premises.  That is, C2 is deducible solely 
from given premises, without any further information, only when P3 is 
knowable a priori.  For if not, C1 is not deducible a priori from P2 and P3, 
and thus C2 is not deducible a priori from P1 and C1.  From this, it 
follows that the existence of a priori truths is necessarily required for 
Chalmers and Jackson’s reductive explanation.  For the A Priori 
Scrutability thesis, which is indispensable in their reductive explanation, 
would not be obtained without a priori truths.  
 
3.2. A Priori Scrutability and Epistemic Two-Dimensional 
Semantics 
We saw that the A Priori Scrutability thesis serves as a foundation for the 
reductive explanation.  The thesis also plays a foundational role in 
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constructing primary intension, which satisfies the Core thesis, and thereby 
in defending Fregean semantics.  An expression’s primary intension is 
defined as a function from scenarios to its extensions.  But, what is a 
scenario? According to Chalmers, a scenario is intuitively understood as a 
conjunction of sentences, which states ‘a maximally specific way the world 
might be, for all we know a priori’ (Chalmers 2012, p. 234).  More 
precisely, a conjunction of sentences is a scenario just in case that the 
conjunction satisfies following two conditions: first, it should be 
epistemically possible, or its negation should be ruled out a priori; second, 
it should be epistemically complete, that is, for any sentence G, there should 
be no G such that the conjunction & G and the conjunction & ~G are 
epistemically possible.  From this, we can know that the a priori plays an 
indispensable role in constructing scenarios. 
 The A Priori Scrutability thesis can be generalized to the following 
thesis: 
Generalized A Priori Scrutability: There is a compact 
class such that every epistemically possible sentence is 
scrutable from some epistemically possible subclass of the 
compact class.15   
 
The above thesis implies that a compact class is partitioned into 
epistemically possible subclasses.  A scenario thus can be understood as an 
equivalence class of epistemically complete sentences in the compact class.  
 Chalmers employs scenarios and the Generalized A Priori 
                                            
15 See Chalmers, Constructing the World, p. 235.  
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Scrutability thesis to construct primary intensions, and thereby defend 
Fregean semantics.  A sentence’s primary intension is then defined as a 
function from scenarios, which amount to possible worlds considered as 
actual, to its truth-values.  From this, we can get the Core thesis, which 
claims that any sentence S is knowable a priori for a subject iff its primary 
intension is true for the subject at every scenario.  
 We so far examined how Chalmers constructs primary intensions 
from the A Priori Scrutability thesis.  His ultimate goal is to defend 
Fregean semantics.  He thus needs to show that primary intensions behave 
like Fregean senses.  That is, he needs to prove that the intensions play 
roles in cognition and in determining extension.  Let’s consider Frege’s 
example, ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’.  Suppose that a subject utters that 
sentence.  Then, ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is not a priori because the 
primary intention of the sentence will be false at some scenarios in which 
Mars satisfies the description of ‘Hesperus’ while Venus satisfies the 
description of ‘Phosphorus’.  Then, it follows that ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorus’ have different primary intensions by the compositionality of 
meaning.  Then, since ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ also have different 
senses, primary intensions can be said to behave like Fregean senses.  The 
general claim of this is that the Neo-Fregean thesis saying that ‘two 
expressions (in context) have the same primary intension if and only if they 
are a priori equivalent’ (Chalmers 2012, p.246).  According to Chalmers, 
primary intensions also play another crucial role as Fregean senses.  An 
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expression’s primary intension, as we saw, is defined as a function from 
scenarios to its extensions.  This implies that an expression’s primary 
intension can functionally determine its extensions if a scenario is given.  
For example, given the twin Earth scenario, the primary intension of ‘water’ 
yields XYZ as its extension while the primary intension yields H2O as its 
extension if the Earth scenario is given.    
 Chalmers aims to define primary intensions which can serve 
Fregean sense’s roles, especially roles in cognition and in determining an 
expression’s extension.  To achieve his goal, he should prove the Core 
thesis, which claims that every sentence is knowable a priori for a subject 
iff its primary intension is true for the subject at every scenario.  Chalmers 
undoubtedly assumes the existence of a priori sentences which are 
significantly distinct from a posteriori sentences, and then he attempts to 
construct primary intensions from the a priori in such a way that the 
intensions reflect the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori.  
Thus, we can conclude that the notion of apriority plays an indispensable 
role in defining primary intensions, and thereby in defending Fregean 
semantics.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
Chapter 2 
 Chalmers’ Critique of Quine’s Attack on the A 
Priori 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, we discussed Chalmers’ distinctive 
semantic theory, epistemic two-dimensional semantics, according to which 
any expression can be associated with two kinds of intensions.  One is the 
familiar post-Kripkean intension, what he calls ‘secondary intension’ which 
is a function from possible worlds considered as counterfactual to 
extensions.  The other is an epistemic intension, what he calls ‘primary 
intension’ which is a function from possible worlds considered as actual to 
extensions.  His distinctive claim is that primary intension satisfies some 
properties of the Fregean sense.  That is, he claims that an expression’s 
primary intension plays roles in cognition and in determining its extension.  
Thus, it is paramount for Chalmers to construct primary intension in such a 
way that it behaves in a Fregean sense.  He thinks that if we demonstrate 
the Core thesis, which claims that a sentence is a priori iff its primary 
intension is true at every scenario, then primary intensions satisfy most of 
the properties of Fregean senses.  What we need to note is that he takes for 
granted the existence of the a priori which is distinguished from the a 
posteriori.  He attempts to define primary intensions from scenarios and 
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the Generalized A Priori Scrutability thesis, which are constructed from the 
notion of apriority.   
 However, there have been some objections to the existence of the a 
priori.  Quine especially, in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1953; 1980), 
provides a powerful argument against the distinction between the a priori 
and the a posteriori.   Chalmers thus at least needs to rebut Quine’s 
argument against the existence of a priori sentences in order to justify his 
epistemic two-dimensional semantics, which he attempts. (Chalmers 2011; 
2012) 
 In what follows, I will discuss Chalmers’ critique of Quine’s attack 
on the a priori.  I will first examine how Chalmers understands Quine’s 
attack on the a priori.  I think that Chalmers understands Quine’s attack as 
follows: If there are a priori sentences, then those sentences are to be 
unrevisable; but every sentence is in principle revisable; therefore, there are 
no a priori sentences.  Chalmers’ strategy is to show that the fact that every 
sentence is revisable is consistent with the distinction between the a priori 
and the a posteriori.  He thus claims that there are a priori sentences that 
are revisable.  In section 3, I will discuss Chalmers’ starting point of his 
critique.  His critique of Quine’s attack on the a priori has been developed 
from Grice and Strawson’s argument that cases of revision involving 
conceptual change are distinguished from those involving conceptual 
constancy; this distinction is compatible with the a priori/a posteriori 
distinction.  But their argument is successful only when the distinction 
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between cases of revision involving conceptual change and those involving 
conceptual constancy can be principally drawn.  Chalmers thus attempts to 
give a criterion for the principled distinction between cases of revision 
involving conceptual change and those involving conceptual constancy.  In 
the next section, I will explore Chalmers’ reconstruction of Carnap’s 
account of intension.  According to Chalmers, we can find a basic idea of 
the distinction in Carnap’s dispositional account of an expression’s intension.  
Chalmers thinks that Carnap’s account itself cannot provide the required 
criterion, but Carnap’s idea is fundamentally right.  So he makes an 
attempt to revise Carnap’s account in such a way that the revised account 
can distinguish, in principle, cases involving conceptual change from those 
involving conceptual constancy.  This account, however, presupposes the 
notion of apriority, which he aims to prove.  Chalmers thus attempts to 
provide a criterion for the principled distinction between cases of revision 
involving conceptual change and those involving conceptual constancy, 
without presupposing the a priori.  In the final section of this chapter, I 
will scrutinize Chalmers’ master argument against Quine’s attack on the a 
priori in which he uses Bayesian epistemology which is regarded as a good 
formal account of how an epistemic subject updates her belief about some 
outcome conditional on another outcome.  He claims that his account 
demonstrates that revisability of sentences is compatible with the distinction 
between the a priori and the a posteriori, and thus Quine’s argument that 
revisability implies that there is no a priori/a posteriori distinction is not 
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valid.  
 
2. Chalmers’ Understanding of Quine’s Attack on the A Priori 
 Quine, in “Two Dogmas”, criticizes logical empiricists’ adherence 
to the following two bad dogmas: 
 
Dogma1. All true statements are divided into analytic 
statements which are grounded in meanings independently 
of matters of fact and synthetic statements which are 
grounded in both facts and its meanings.  
Dogma2. Every significant synthetic statement is 
equivalent to a statement which consist of words refer to 
immediate experience logically.16 
 
According to some received understanding of the “Two Dogmas”, the paper 
is organized as follows: Dogma 1 is mostly discussed in sections 1-4.  
Quine there presents the circularity argument that all our attempts to make 
sense of the analytic requires prior understanding of the analytic so that we 
cannot give any adequate definition of the analytic, and thus our use of the 
analytic is not legitimate.  Many philosophers, however, have been 
unmoved by this argument.  For they have thought the argument requires 
too strong of a presupposition that a notion is intelligible only when there is 
an explicit noncircular characterization of the notion.  Quine discusses 
Dogma 2 in section 5.  He there criticizes the logical empiricists’ 
reductionist program.  He then in the final section presents empiricism 
without dogmas, and also provides an argument against the distinction 
                                            
16 See Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, p. 20. 
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between the analytic and the synthetic.  I think that Chalmers’ 
understanding of the “Two Dogmas” is almost identical to the received 
understanding.  
 Quine’s criticism against Dogma 1 can be understood as the 
criticism against the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori as 
well as the criticism against the distinction between the analytic and the 
synthetic.  If a sentence is determined as true only in virtue of its meaning, 
and thus the sentence is knowable solely by grasping its meaning, then the 
sentence would be said to be knowable a priori.  In other words, if a 
sentence expresses a conceptual truth, then the sentence would be said to be 
both analytic and a priori.  On the other hand, if a sentence is determined 
as true because of both a particular empirical fact and its meaning, and 
hence knowledge of the sentence requires the empirical fact, then the 
sentence would be said to be knowable a posteriori.  For this reason, I 
think that Chalmers focuses on Dogma1.  
 Many philosophers think that Quine’s most influential argument is 
found in the final section of “Two Dogmas”, which Chalmers addresses.  
He especially notes the following second paragraph in the final section: 
 
If this view is right, it is misleading to speak of the 
empirical content of an individual statement – especially if 
it is a statement at all remote from the experimental 
periphery of the field.  Furthermore it becomes folly to 
seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold 
contingently on experience, and analytic statements, which 
hold come what may.  Any statement can be held true 
come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustment 
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elsewhere in the system.  Even a statement very close to 
the periphery can be held true in the face of recalcitrant 
experience by pleading hallucination or by amending 
certain statements of the kind called logical laws.  
Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to 
revision. Revision even of the logical law of the excluded 
middle has been proposed as a means of simplifying 
quantum mechanics; and what difference is there in 
principle between such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler 
superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin 
Aristotle? 
(Quine 1953; 1980, p.43) 
 
Chalmers understands Quine’s attack on the distinction between the a priori 
and the a posteriori to be founded upon the following thesis:  
 
Q. ‘No statement is immune to revision.’ 
 
Let’s suppose that one claims that a priori sentences are immune to revision 
while a posteriori sentences are revisable contingently on experience, and 
thus, there is a clear distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori.  
Q then refutes this claim.  Q says that no sentence can be regarded as an a 
priori sentence.  It follows that it is folly to attempt to draw a clear 
distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori.  Thus, Quine’s 
argument can be understood as follows: Q implies that there is no distinction 
between the a priori and the a posteriori.  On the other hand, Chalmers 
thinks that Q is compatible with the a priori/a posteriori distinction, and 
thus Q does not imply that there are no a priori sentences which are 
epistemically distinct from a posteriori sentences.  
 
3. Grice and Strawson’s Response to Quine’s Attack on the A 
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Priori  
Chalmers’ critique of Quine’s attack on the a priori starts from 
Grice and Strawson’s response to “Two Dogmas”.  More specifically, he 
develops his critique from the following paragraph in their article, “In 
Defense of a Dogma” (1956): 
 
Now for the doctrine that there is no statement which is in 
principle immune from revision, no statement which might 
not be given up in the face of experience.  Acceptance of 
this doctrine is quite consistent with adherence to the 
distinction between analytic and synthetic statements.  
Only, the adherent of this distinction must also insist on 
another, on the distinction between that kind of giving up 
which consists in merely admitting falsity, and that kind of 
giving up which involves changing or dropping a concept 
or set of concepts.  Any form of words at one time held to 
express something true may, no doubt, at another time, 
come to be held to express something false.  But it is not 
only philosophers who would distinguish between the case 
where this happens as the result of a change of opinion 
solely as to matters of fact, and the case where this happens 
at least partly as a result of a shift in the sense of the words.  
Where such a shift in the sense of the words is a necessary 
condition of the change in truth-value, then the adherent of 
the distinction will say that the form of words in question 
changes from expressing an analytic statement to 
expressing a synthetic statement. […]  And if we can 
make sense of this idea, then we can perfectly well preserve 
the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic, while 
conceding to Quine the revisability-in-principle of 
everything we say.  
(Grice and Strawson 1956: 156-7) 
 
Grice and Strawson, in the above paragraph, argue that the acceptance of Q 
is compatible with holding on to the distinction between the analytic (a 
priori) and the synthetic (a posteriori) since every sentence is in principle 
revisable diachronically in virtue of a conceptual change of the sentence, but 
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this fact does not imply that the sentence before the conceptual change could 
not be analytic (a priori).  For a revision involving conceptual change is 
justified independently of sense-experience while a revision involving 
conceptual constancy is justified ultimately by sense-experience.  For 
instance, suppose that Tess has a concept <unmarried man> for the 
expression ‘bachelor’ at t1 while a concept <social man> at t2 for the same 
expression.  In this case, it is plausible to think that if Tess were required to 
answer the question whether ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is true or false, 
she would say ‘true’ at t1 while ‘false’ at t2.  We supposed that for Tess, a 
concept of ‘bachelor’ is <unmarried man> at t1, but <social man> at t2.  
This is obviously a case where conceptual change has occurred between t1 
and t2.  But the following case is also possible: Tess has possessed the 
same concept <social man> for ‘bachelor’ continuously from t1 to t2.  This 
is a case where conceptual change has not occurred.  According to Grice 
and Strawson, an analytic (a priori) sentence is the sentence that is immune 
to revision if conceptual change of the sentence does not occur.  In other 
words, an analytic (a priori) sentence is revisable only when conceptual 
change of the sentence occurs.  On the other hands, a synthetic (a 
posteriori) sentence is the sentence which is revisable even where 
conceptual change of the sentence does not occur.  Therefore, they argue 
that we cannot conclude that Q implies that there is no distinction between 
the analytic (a priori) and the synthetic (a posteriori). 
 However, Grice and Strawson’s argument can be successful only 
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when there is a criterion for the principled distinction between Q involving 
conceptual change and Q involving conceptual constancy.  Consider the 
following case: Tess asserted that ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is true at t1 
but false at t2 because of some psychological reason even if conceptual 
change for ‘bachelor’ did not occur.  Then, according to Grice and 
Strawson’s analysis, this case would be one where Q occurred regardless of 
conceptual change, and thus ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ would not be 
analytic (a priori) but synthetic (a posteriori), a result Chalmers, as well as 
Grice and Strawson, would not want to accept.  Chalmers, for this reason, 
tries to present a criterion for the principled distinction between Q involving 
conceptual change and Q involving conceptual constancy, and thereby 
shows that Q is compatible with the distinction between the analytic (a 
priori) and the synthetic (a posteriori). 
 
4. A Carnapian Response to Quine’s Attack on the A Priori 
 Carnap also, like Quine, agrees with Q.17  But he, unlike Quine, 
claims that Q is compatible with the distinction between the a priori and the 
a posteriori.  According to Chalmers, we can find a basic idea for the 
principled distinction between cases of Q involving conceptual change and 
those without conceptual change in Carnap’s works, especially, in “Meaning 
                                            
17 Carnap actually says, ‘No statement is immune to revision.’  See Carnap, 
“Quine on Logical Truth”, p.921.  From this, we can judge that revisability itself 
is not a controversial issue at all on Carnap and Quine’s dispute about the 
distinction between the analytic (a priori) and the synthetic (a posteriori).  
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and Synonymy in Natural Language” (1955).  In this article, Carnap argues 
that an expression’s meaning is its intension, which is determined by a 
subject’s linguistic dispositions.  Thus, according to him, we can 
investigate an expression’s intension such as the intension of ‘+’ by 
presenting descriptions of possible cases to a subject and then demanding 
the subject to judge what ‘+’ applies to.  In other words, Carnap insists that 
an expression’s intension is understood as a function from possible cases to 
extensions that a subject is disposed to identify in each given case.  From 
this, we can judge that Carnap’s intension is characterized in terms of the 
naturalistic term, ‘disposition’.  For this reason, Chalmers says, ‘If we 
accept Carnap’s dispositional account of intensions, it follows that E 
undergoes change in meaning between t1 and t2 iff there is a possible case 
such that the speaker is disposed to associate different extensions with E 
when presented with the case at t1 and t2.’ (Chalmers 2012, p. 205)  Thus, 
with the notion of intension defined in this way, we can define the a priori 
as follows: for any sentence S, S is a priori for a given speaker at a given 
time iff the sentence is true at every possible cases for the given speaker at 
the time.  
  Can Carnap’s dispositional account of intension provide a criterion 
for the principled distinction between cases of Q involving conceptual 
change and those without conceptual change?  Chalmers thinks that 
Carnap’s account itself cannot provide it, but the account has an essential 
aspect which is associated with it.  Thus, he does not dismiss Carnap’s 
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account altogether; rather he attempts to revise Carnap’s account in such a 
way the revised account can provide a criterion for the principled distinction 
between cases of Q involving conceptual change and those without 
conceptual change.18 
 Why does Chalmers think that Carnap’s account is to be revised?  
I will examine problems of Carnap’s account that Chalmers points out, and 
then Chalmers’ attempt to avoid the problems.  
 First, let’s consider how Carnap distinguishes Q involving 
conceptual change from Q without conceptual change.  Think about ‘All 
cats are animals’ which might seem to be paradigmatically a priori, as 
presented by Hilary Putnam (1962).  Let’s suppose that Nancy asserted that 
all cats are animals at t1, and then acquired evidence that the furry, 
apparently feline creature on her shoulder is actually a remote-controlled 
robot from Mars, while all the other creatures she sees are organic, and thus 
she withdraws her assertion that all cats are animals at t2.  Let S be ‘All 
cats are animals’, and let the above detailed possible case be E. 
 The above case is an example of revision of an apparently a priori 
sentence, ‘All cats are animals’.  The issue is whether conceptual change of 
S affected the revision of S or not.  Let’s apply Carnap’s account of 
intension into this case.  Since Nancy would say that S is false if E were 
presented to her at t2, the intension of S with respect to E would be false at t2.  
Then, what about Nancy’s intension for S at t1?  Here the key question: 
                                            
18 See Chalmers, Constructing the World, p. 205. 
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would Nancy have judged S was true with respect to E if E were presented 
for her at t1 before she acquired the evidence which indicates E? 
 If Nancy’s answer is yes, then, according to Carnap’s account of 
intension, there was no conceptual change of S between t1 and t2, and this is 
a case where she had an unusual intension for ‘cat’ all along.  On the other 
hand, if Nancy’s answer is no, then Carnap’s account suggests that there was 
a conceptual change of S, and thus Q of S occurred between t1 and t2. 
 So far, we have examined how Carnap’s account of intensions 
distinguishes Q involving conceptual change from Q without conceptual 
change.  Chalmers thinks Carnap’s account is essentially right, but there 
are some problems in his account.  Thus, he attempts to revise the account.  
For Carnap, as we saw, a sentence is a priori iff the sentence is true at all 
possible cases.  But, what are possible cases?  Chalmers uses the 
Generalized A Priori Scrutability thesis to define possible cases.  The 
thesis says that there is a compact class of C of true sentences such that all 
epistemically possible sentences are entailed a priori from some 
epistemically possible subclass of C.  From this, Chalmers defines possible 
cases as equivalent classes of epistemically complete sentences in a compact 
class of the Generalized A Priori Scrutability thesis.  Chalmers calls 
possible cases defined in this way ‘scenarios’.  According to Carnap’s 
account of intensions, if possible cases that water is H2O are presented to a 
subject who does not know that water is H2O, then the subject will not have 
any disposition to identify H2O as the extension of ‘water’.  But, according 
 
 40 
to Kripke (1980), the intension of ‘water’ is, even for the given subject, H2O 
in every possible case.  Thus, if Kripke were right, Carnap’s dispositional 
account of intension would be false.  Chalmers suggests a solution to this 
problem by distinguishing primary intension which is based on the 
epistemic understanding of possibilities, from secondary intensions, which 
is on based on the metaphysical understanding of possibilities.  In other 
words, he attempts to solve the problem by defining primary intension as a 
function from scenarios as epistemic possibilities to extension which is 
compatible with Kripke’s intension, what Chalmers calls secondary 
intension: a function from possibilities considered as counterfactual to 
extensions.  Chalmers also points out a subject’s mistake as a problem of 
Carnap’s dispositional account of intension.  A subject can be mistaken.  
For instance, it is possible that a subject mistakes that 2+2=5.  Even more, 
it is possible that the subject has a disposition to always say ‘yes’ to the 
question whether 2+2=5.  According to Carnap’s account, then ‘2+2=5’ is 
to be a priori for the given subject, but this is of course an absurd 
consequence.  To avoid this kind of problem, Chalmers defines the notion 
of intension in terms of a subject’s normatively idealized judgment, instead 
of a subject’s dispositional judgment.19 
 Chalmers now defines primary intensions in terms of scenarios, 
scrutability, and normative idealization in such a way that the defined 
intensions can avoid the problems Carnap’s intension faces.  He says, ‘The 
                                            
19 See Chalmers, Constructing the World, pp. 207-11. 
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(primary) intension of an expression for a subject is a function that maps 
scenarios to extensions.  Given a sentence S and a scenario w specified by 
a set of sentence D, the intension of S is true at w if S is scrutable from D, 
false at w if ~S is scrutable from D, and so on.’ (Chalmers 2012, p. 209)  
Chalmers, in this quotation, uses a scrutability framework to define the 
primary intension.  But, what kind of scrutability should be used to define 
the primary intension?  One might hope that if we use the a priori 
scrutability framework to define primary intensions, then we will get a 
criterion for the principled distinction between cases of Q involving 
conceptual change and those without conceptual change.  That is, one 
might suggest that for any sentence S, S will be revisable with conceptual 
change of S between t1 and t2 iff there is a scenario, w, such that S is 
scrutable from w at t1 but ~S is scrutable from w at t2.  However, this is not 
a good suggestion for Chalmers, because even if this suggestion were 
successful in drawing the principled distinction, the distinction depends on 
the contested notion of apriority.  
 
5. A Bayesian Response to Quine’s Attack on the A Priori 
 In the previous section, we saw how Chalmers defines primary 
intensions in terms of an a priori scrutability framework, and then provides 
a criterion for the principled distinction between cases of Q involving 
conceptual change and those without conceptual change.  But this attempt 
is unhelpful for Chalmers because it presupposes the contested notion of 
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apriority which Quine doubts.  Chalmers thus exploits Bayesian 
epistemology, which does not appeal to the notion of apriority, to provide a 
criterion for the principled distinction between cases of Q involving 
conceptual change and those without conceptual change, and thereby argues 
that one who accepts Q can rationally adhere to the distinction between the 
a priori and the a posteriori.   
 Bayesian epistemology is based on the notion of credence and the 
principle of conditionalization.  By Bayesian epistemology, for any 
proposition S and T, a subject can associate unconditional credence cr(S) 
and cr(T), and also conditional credence cr(S│T) sometimes.  Credences 
are usually understood as something like a subject’s degree of expectation 
for the truth of a proposition or a hypothesis or etc., and regarded as a kind 
of probability, i.e., a subjective probability.  Thus, it is natural to think of 
credences as real numbers between 0 and 1 in such a way that a subject has 
a credence of 1 for a proposition when she is certain that the proposition is 
true, while the subject has a credence of 0 for a proposition when she is 
certain that the proposition is false.20 
 Bayesian epistemology is widely regarded as a good formal theory 
which explains how a subject updates her belief about an outcome in light of 
new evidence.  In this account, the principle of conditionalization for 
propositions usually plays a crucial role.  
                                            
20 Cf. Strevens, “Notes on Bayesian Confirmation Theory”, p.7.  
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CP. If a rational subject has a credence for a proposition S, 
conditional on another proposition, T at t1, cr1(S│T), and 
acquires total relevant evidence which support T between t1 
and t2, then cr2(S) should be equal to cr1(S│T).
21  
 
If a subject revises her mind about a proposition S conditional on another 
proposition T, that is, cr2(S)≠cr1(S│T), then there is only one way the 
subject revises her mind about S, according to CP: the subject is irrational.  
Since Chalmers’ goal is to distinguish cases of Q involving conceptual 
change and those without conceptual change, CP is unhelpful for him.  
Thus, he induces another version of conditionalization, which is useful for 
his goal.  He notes a rational inference rule, Modus Ponens, which states a 
constitutive connection between rational inference and conceptual 
continuity: for any sentence S and E, if E→S and E, then S.  Suppose that a 
subject violates this rule diachronically.  Then, it follows that either if 
S&E’s meaning did not change, then the subject is irrational, or if the 
subject is rational, then either the meanings of both S and E changed or one 
of the sentences changed.  
 Chalmers, from the constitutive connection between rational 
inference and conceptual continuity and CP, gets the principle of 
conditionalization for sentences: 
 
CS. If a subject is fully rational, and if the subject acquires 
total evidence specified by E between t1 and t2, and if the 
                                            
21 ‘CP’ stands for ‘conditionalization for propositions’. 
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content of sentence S does not change between t1 and t2, 
then cr2(S) = cr1(S│E).                      
                                   (Chalmers 2012, p. 213) 
 
CS, unlike CP, can distinguish cases of Q involving conceptual change from 
those without conceptual change.  In other words, according to CS, there 
are two ways a subject revises her mind about a sentence S: the content of S 
can change or the subject can be irrational.  Chalmers identifies the former 
with a case of Q involving conceptual change of S, and the latter with a case 
of Q without conceptual change of S.  
 Chalmers attempts to show that there is a clear distinction between 
the a priori and the a posteriori on the basis of the distinction between cases 
of Q involving conceptual change and those without conceptual change.  
Let me give two cases: a case of Q involving conceptual change and a case 
without conceptual change, according to CS.   
 At first, let’s consider a case of Q involving conceptual change, 
according to CS.   Let S be the sentence ‘Water is a clear liquid that every 
human being should drink in order to maintain her existence’ and E is the 
sentence that specifies total relevant evidence indicating that there is a 
human being who does not need to drink water in order to maintain her 
existence.  Let’s also assume that the extension of ‘water’ is H2O 
continuously from t1 to t2.  Now suppose that a rational biochemist, Suzie, 
had a high unconditional credence of S at t1, that is, cr1(S) was high for her; 
she acquired the total relevant evidence that E specifies between t1 and t2; 
after acquiring the total evidence, her unconditional credence of S at t2, 
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cr2(S) was low.  Then, does Suzie’s case of Q involve conceptual change or 
not?  Chalmers suggests to consider the following question: What is her 
credence of S conditional on E at t1, i.e. cr1(S│E)?  Suppose that cr1(S│E) 
is high.  This case then violates CS.  We assumed that Suzie acquired the 
total relevant evidence that E specifies between t1 and t2, and she is rational. 
Then, from CS, it follows that the meaning of S changed between t1 and t2, 
and thus this case falls under Q involving conceptual change.  In other 
words, according to Chalmers, we can plausibly conclude that Suzie 
changed the concept for ‘water’ from <a clear liquid that every human being 
should drink in order to maintain her existence> at t1 to <a clear liquid that 
some human being does not need to drink in order to maintain her 
existence> at t2, and thus she had a high unconditional credence of the 
conceptual matter that water is a clear liquid that every human being should 
drink in order to maintain her existence that S expresses at t1; after 
conceptual change of ‘water’, she had a low credence of the empirical 
matter that water is a clear liquid that every human being should drink in 
order to maintain her existence that S expresses at t2.  Thus, according to 
Chalmers, ‘Water is a clear liquid that every human being should drink in 
order to maintain her existence’ could be a priori for Suzie at t1, even 
though the sentence was revised between t1 and t2.    
 Next, consider a case of Q without conceptual change, according to 
Chalmers.  Let S be the sentence, ‘Water is H2O’, and E be the sentence 
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that specifies total relevant evidence indicating that every human being 
should drink XYZ, not H2O in order to maintain her existence.  Now 
suppose that a rational business man, Tylor, who does not know advanced 
chemistry at all, had a high unconditional credence of S at t1, that is, cr1(S) is 
high for him; he acquired total relevant evidence that E specifies between t1 
and t2; and then he had a low unconditional credence of S at t2, that is, cr2(S) 
was low for him.  In this case, according to Chalmers, the diagnostic 
question to judge whether Tylor’s revision on S does involve conceptual 
change or not, is the following question: what is his credence of S 
conditional on E at t1, cr1(S│E)?  If cr1(S│E) is low, then cr2(S) = cr1(S│E), 
and thus Tylor’s rejecting of S in light of E accords with CS. Since we 
assumed Tylor is rational, and he acquired total relevant evidence that E 
specifies, we can conclude that the meaning of S expresses the empirical 
truth that water is H2O continuously from t1 to t2, and thus, Tylor’s revision 
of S does not involve conceptual change of constituents of S.  Thus, this 
case is an instance of Q without conceptual change, due to CS.  According 
to Chalmers, we can conclude that ‘Water is H2O’ did not express a 
conceptual truth, and thus the sentence was initially not an a priori sentence.  
 Chalmers thinks that we can draw the principled distinction 
between cases of Q involving conceptual change and those without 
conceptual change on the basis of CS. According to him, the first case 
belongs to Q involving conceptual change, and the second case belongs to Q 
without conceptual change. On the grounds of this distinction, Chalmers 
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argues that Q is compatible with the distinction between the a priori and the 
a posteriori, and thus Quine’s attack on the a priori fails.  
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Chapter 3 
 Reconsidering Quine’s Critique of the A Priori 
in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”  
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 In the previous chapter, we examined how Chalmers responds to 
Quine’s attack on the a priori, namely, Quine’s argument in the final section 
of “Two Dogmas”.  Chalmers understands the argument as follows: Quine 
argues that a priori sentences, if they exist, are to be unrevisable; but no 
sentence is in principle immune to revision; therefore there are no a priori 
sentences.  On the other hand, Chalmers argues that there are a priori 
sentences which are revisable, contrary to Quine.  He employs Bayesian 
epistemology to distinguish revisability of sentences into two kinds: one 
involving conceptual change and one without conceptual change.  After 
distinguishing these two kinds of revisability, he argues that revisability is 
compatible with the a priori/a posteriori distinction, and thus revisability 
does not imply that there is no such a distinction.  Carnap, like Chalmers, 
held that there are a priori sentences which are revisable.  That is, he 
claimed that a sentence is a priori relative to a language.  But his claim 
holds only when revision involving language change is epistemically 
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distinguished from revision without language change.22 
 In this chapter, I will reconstruct Quine’s argument against the a 
priori in “Two Dogmas” such that the reconstructed argument refutes 
Carnap’s relativized a priori.  The argument is based in two Quinean 
doctrines, epistemological holism and underdetermination of theory by 
evidence.  This argument will shed light on why Chalmers’ response to 
Quine’s attack on the a priori fails.  
 I will organize this chapter as follows.  First, I briefly discuss some 
historical background of Quine’s discussion on the analytic, for a better 
understanding of Quine’s argument against the a priori.  In section 3, I 
examine how the absolute a priori is refuted by epistemological holism.  In 
the next section, I show that Carnap’s relativized a priori is repudiated by 
the two Quinean doctrines, epistemological holism and underdetermination 
of theory by evidence.  The two doctrines also refute Chalmers’ apriority, 
which will be dealt with in my final chapter.  In the final section of this 
chapter, I discuss how Quine can explain the epistemic status of logic and 
mathematics, which obviously appears to be different from experimental 
sciences such as physics, psychology, etc.   
 
2. Some Background for Quine’s Attack on the A Priori 
 Quine, in “Two Dogmas”, seems to argue merely against the 
                                            
22  My concern for Carnap in this chapter is to explain the extent that his 
philosophy influenced Quine, not to provide a comprehensive account of Carnap’s 
philosophy itself. 
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analytic, especially, the logical empiricists’ conception of the analytic.  But 
“Two Dogmas” has a powerful argument against the a priori.  Perhaps, it 
would be helpful to start with some historical background for Quine’s 
discussion on the a priori and the analytic.  Consider supposedly necessary 
truths such as mathematical and logical truths.  We seem to know 
necessary truths such as 2+2=4.  If knowledge of necessary truths is 
possible, then such knowledge, unlike knowledge of contingent truths such 
as Germany winning the 2014 World Cup, does not seem to depend on 
sense-experience at all.  Then, how can we know necessary truths?  
Broadly speaking, rationalists in general have insisted that we human beings 
have rational intuitions, which are used to know necessary truths, without 
any dependence on sense-experience.  According to rationalists, our 
knowledge of necessary truths is substantial knowledge about the world, but 
the existence of rational intuition seems no less mysterious than the 
existence of necessary truths.  On the other hand, empiricists in general 
reject the existence of rational intuition, claiming that all substantial 
knowledge is ultimately based on sense-experience.  Thus, they have 
insisted that our knowledge of necessary truths is nothing more than 
knowledge constructed from our operations of existing ideas that are formed 
by sense-experience.  The empiricists’ account of necessary truths is less 
mysterious than the rationalists’ account, but makes our knowledge of 
necessary truths somewhat trivial.  
 Kant thought that there are both substantial and trivial knowledge of 
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necessary truths.  He held that all necessary truths are knowable a priori, 
and vice versa, and thus he attempted to settle the question of how we can 
know necessary truths by resolving the question of how a priori knowledge 
is possible.  According to him, a priori knowledge is divided into two 
kinds: one is a priori knowledge of analytic truths, which do not seem to be 
mysterious, but trivial; the other is a priori knowledge of synthetic truths, 
which seem to be substantial, but is in need of an account of how synthetic a 
priori knowledge is possible.  Kant took for granted the existence of 
synthetic a priori knowledge.  That is, he believed that we can find 
synthetic a priori knowledge in mathematics, namely, arithmetic and 
geometry.23 
 Logical empiricists, including Carnap, however, completely rejected 
the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge by sorting Kant’s main 
examples of synthetic a priori knowledge into either analytic a priori 
knowledge or synthetic a posteriori knowledge.  In other words, they 
classified arithmetic as analytic a priori by reflecting on the results of 
logicism, developed by Frege and Russell, but geometry as synthetic a 
posteriori by reflecting on non-Euclidean Geometry and theory of relativity.   
 Frege’s logicism is a philosophical claim that arithmetic is reducible 
to logic by some adequate definitions, and thus arithmetical truths are 
analytic.  It presupposes that a sentence is analytic just in case it is 
reducible, through some adequate definition, to a logical truth.  Frege 
                                            
23 See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B15 and B16. 
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thought that definition sentences are true by its meaning.  Thus, for Frege, 
an analytic sentence is true in virtue of its meaning and logical truths.  But, 
what is the nature of logical truths?  Frege actually does not discuss much 
this question.  Rather, logical empiricists answered that logical truths are 
true solely in virtue of the meaning of the logical constants such as ‘and’, 
‘or’, etc.  Thus, for logical empiricists, a sentence is analytic when the 
sentence is true solely in virtue of its meaning.  Therefore, logical 
empiricists held that the analytic is coextensive with the a priori, and 
moreover, the former accounts for the latter.  According to them, analytic 
sentences do not make an assertion about the world at all, and thus they are 
knowable without any dependence on sense-experience such that they are 
true no matter what.24 With this background, Quine’s argument against the 
analytic would be understood as one against the a priori.25 
 
3. No Absolute A Priori 
 Quine, in sections 1-3 of the “Two Dogmas” thoroughly examines 
whether the notion of meaning is legitimate or not.  He there argues that 
there is no principled reason to believe in meanings, and thus in the a priori, 
which is true purely in virtue of meanings.  We may suspect that Quine’s 
argument is not enough to warrant that there is no principled reason to 
                                            
24 But this account of analyticity (apriority), as we will see shortly, is not exactly 
applied to Carnap’s analyticity (apriority). For his analyticity (apriority) is not an 
absolute notion, and thus analytic (a priori) sentences, like synthetic (a posteriori) 
sentences, are in principle revisable. But he also held that the analytic is 
coextensive with the a priori, and moreover the former accounts for the latter.  
25 Cf. Burgess, “Quine’s Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics”, pp. 282-83. 
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believe in meanings.  But, even if Quine’s argument is successful, his 
argument does not rule out the possibility of the existence of meanings, and 
thus of the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori.  For 
example, even if there were an argument, which warrants that there is no 
principled reason to believe in irrational numbers such as √2, the argument 
does not rule out the possibility of the existence of irrational numbers.  
Similarly, we still do not have a principled reason to reject the absolute a 
priori completely. 
 Quine provides an argument against the absolute a priori in the last 
section of “Two Dogmas”.  He says, 
 
If this view is right, it is misleading to speak of the 
empirical content of an individual statement – especially if 
it is a statement at all remote from the experimental 
periphery of the field.  Furthermore it becomes folly to 
seek a boundary between synthetic statements, which hold 
contingently on experience, and analytic statements, which 
hold come what may.  Any statement can be held true 
come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustment 
elsewhere in the system.  Even a statement very close to 
the periphery can be held true in the face of recalcitrant 
experience by pleading hallucination or by amending 
certain statements of the kind called logical laws.  
Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to 
revision. Revision even of the logical law of the excluded 
middle has been proposed as a means of simplifying 
quantum mechanics; and what difference is there in 
principle between such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler 
superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin 
Aristotle? 
(Quine 1953; 1980, p.43) 
 
Now, Quine can refute the a priori, which is unrevisable.  The supposed 
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distinction between the a priori and a posteriori is grounded in the 
uncritical assumption of the existence of meanings.  If we assume the 
existence of meanings, then a priori sentences, which are held to be true 
come what may, are distinguished from a posteriori sentences, which are 
held to be true contingently on sense-experience.  But epistemological 
holism states that ‘our statements about the external world face the tribunal 
of sense experience not individually but only as a cooperative way’. (Quine 
1953; 1980, p. 41)  In other words, all sentences have implications for 
sense-experience not individually but only within a theory which consists of 
logically interconnected sentences.  Thus, whenever a subject does have a 
new sense-experience, the subject may revise her belief about any other 
sentences in light of the new experience.  In other words, every sentence is 
in principle revisable.  Epistemological holism states that no sentence is 
immune to revision, and thus it reputes the distinction between the a priori, 
which is unrevisable and the a posteriori, which is revisable.   
 
4. No Relativized A Priori   
 Epistemological holism demonstrates that there is no a priori 
sentence whose truth-value is unrevisable, and thus there is no distinction 
between the a priori and the a posteriori.  But Carnap held that every 
language consists of semantic rules, and further claimed that semantic rules 
are primary a priori sentences, and all other a priori sentences follow from 
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these semantic rules.26 Thus, for Carnap, an a priori sentence is relative to 
language, and therefore the sentence is revisable on the choice of language.  
If we change our language, then some sentences, which were regarded as a 
priori in the old language, may not be counted as a priori, or some other 
sentences, which were not regarded as a priori, may be counted as a priori.  
Carnap’s distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori requires the 
epistemic distinction between the choice of language and the choice of 
theory within a language change. The epistemic distinction between the two 
choices plays an indispensable role in completing the two goals of Carnap’s 
philosophical project: disposing of metaphysics and explaining the 
epistemic status of logic and mathematics.  In “Two Dogmas”, Quine 
explicitly does not provide an argument against Carnap’s relativized a priori, 
but we can construct the argument from the two Quinean doctrines, 
epistemological holism and underdetermination of theory by evidence.  
 Carnap, in his paper, “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” 
                                            
26 Carnap’s semantic rules are intended as an explication of the ordinary vague 
notion of analyticity.  Quine criticizes this attempt.  Carnap thinks that if we 
have an exact artificial language, having explicit semantic rules, then we can have 
the precise notion of analyticity, which is relative to the particular artificial 
language.  He thinks that in doing so, a clear distinction between the analytic and 
the synthetic can be drawn.  Then, a sentence S for Carnap is said to be analytic 
for a particular artificial language L, according to a rule of which begins with ‘A 
sentence S is analytic for some language L0 if and only if …’ Quine, however, 
argues that our understanding of such a rule requires our prior understanding of an 
ordinary notion of analyticity, which is to be explicated.  Carnap of course can 
give another explication of the notion of analyticity as follows: A sentence S is 
analytic for a particular artificial language if the sentence is true according to a 
semantic rule of the language.  But the notion of semantic rule, according to 
Quine, is as much to be clarified as the notion of analyticity. (Quine, 1953; 1980, 
pp. 32-37) 
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(1950), makes an attempt to dispose of metaphysics.  In other words, he 
argues that metaphysical disputes, which has traditionally been considered 
as substantial issues about the world, such as the realism/anti-realism 
dispute, in fact, are nothing more than practical matters about the choice of 
language, which is to be made on the basis of pragmatic standards such as 
clarity, simplicity, convenience, efficiency, etc.  He thus insists that 
metaphysical disputes are not theoretical matters which are right or wrong.  
But his anti-metaphysical claim is grounded in the epistemic distinction 
between the choice of language and the choice of theory within a language.  
In other words, he claims that metaphysical claims are not theoretical 
matters on the grounds that the choice of language, i.e. the choice of 
semantic rules, which serve to resolve questions that are raised within a 
language, is not a theoretical matter; on the other hand, the choice of theory 
within a language can be right or wrong.  This epistemic distinction is 
based on Carnap’s understanding of the distinctive role of language in 
knowledge.  He understands language, including logic, to play a 
framework role in knowledge.  That is, according to Carnap, our 
knowledge is possible only within a language framework.  All languages 
have semantic rules, and thus the choice of language involves the choice of 
semantic rules.  When there is a disagreement about the choice of theory 
under the presupposition of a language, the matter in principle can be 
theoretically resolved because the language has rules for resolving the 
matter.  On the other hand, when there is a disagreement about the choice 
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of language, there are no such rules for settling the dispute, and thus no 
choice of language can be right or wrong.  The epistemic distinction also 
serves to account for the supposedly a priori status of logic and 
mathematics, compatible with the empirical claim that all knowledge about 
the world is based on sense-experience.  According to Carnap, we choose a 
language on the basis of pragmatic factors.  Moreover, he insists that logic 
and mathematics constitute a language, and thus the choice of logic and 
mathematics amounts to the choice of language.  In this way, he explains 
the supposedly a priori status of logic and mathematics while holding on to 
empiricism.  
 Now, let’s further explore Carnap’s conception of apriority.  For 
Carnap, the a priori is relative to language, and thus a priori sentences are 
revisable on the choice of language, but they are unrevisable without 
language change.  On the other hand, a posteriori sentences are revisable 
contingently on the factual elements, regardless of language change.  We 
can then define a priori and a posteriori sentences respectively in terms of 
revision and language change.    A priori sentences are those sentences 
that are not immune to revision without language change.  On the other 
hand, a posteriori sentences are those sentences that are revisable regardless 
of language change.  But this distinction requires the epistemic distinction 
between the revision involving language change and the one without 
language change.  That is, the distinction holds only when the change of 
language is not subject to confirmation or disconfirmation by evidence, 
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while the change of theory within a language is subject to confirmation or 
disconfirmation by evidence.  
 However, the epistemic distinction between the revision involving 
language change and the one without language change is repudiated by the 
two Quinean doctrines, epistemological holism and underdetermination of 
theory by evidence.  
 
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the 
most casual matters of geography and history to the 
profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure 
mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which 
impinges on experience only along the edges.  Or, to 
change the figure, total science is like a field of force whose 
boundary conditions are experience.  A conflict with 
experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the 
interior of the field. Truth values have to be redistributed 
over some of our statements.  Re-evaluation of some 
statements entails re-evaluation of others, because of their 
logical interconnections - the logical laws being in turn 
simply certain further statements of the system, certain 
further elements of the field.  Having re-evaluated one 
statement we must re-evaluate some others, whether they be 
statements logically connected with the first or whether 
they be the statements of logical connections themselves.  
But the total field is so undetermined by its boundary 
conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice 
as to what statements to re- evaluate in the light of any 
single contrary experience.  No particular experiences are 
linked with any particular statements in the interior of the 
field, except indirectly through considerations of 
equilibrium affecting the field as a whole.  
   (Quine 1953; 1980, pp. 42-43, emphases added) 
 
Epistemological holism states that the evidential relation holds between 
theories, which are made up of logically interconnected sentences, and 
experience, not between individual sentences and experience.  
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Underdetermination of theory by evidence states that no evidence can 
determine a uniquely best theory.  Let’s suppose that a chemist observed a 
greenish tint in a test-tube and then asserted the sentence, ‘There is copper 
in the test-tube’.  Now, let’s suppose that a religious person, who believes 
in angels, and does not know chemistry at all, observed a greenish tint in a 
test-tube, and then asserted the sentence, ‘There are two angels in the test-
tube’.27 If we assume that their physical abilities such as eye sight, and the 
observation environment were about the same, then their observations were 
probably much the same.  Then, it follows that the evidence, which 
indicates that there is a greenish tint in a test tube, does not bear on an 
individual sentence such as ‘There is a copper in a test-tube’, or ‘There are 
two angels’.  Rather, the evidence bears on a theory including chemistry or 
a study of angels.  We can also know, from our thought experiment, that 
evidence itself does not determine a uniquely best theory, which 
successfully deals with our sense-experience.  Of course, if we pretty much 
observe the same thing, then most of us will choose chemistry as the best 
theory, which deals with our observation better than a study of angels.  But 
our choice would be made on the basis of pragmatic criterion such as 
prediction, convenience, fruitfulness etc., which, according to Carnap, are 
used only to settle disputes about the choice of language.  
 The two Quinean doctrines imply that there is no unique relation 
                                            
27 See Quine, Word and Object, pp. 10-11.  
Cf. Hylton, “Analyticity and Holism in Quine’s Thought”, p. 15.  
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between a theory and evidence.  The two doctrines imply that pragmatic 
factors play an indispensable role both in the revision involving language 
change and in one without language change.  Then, from the two Quinean 
doctrines, we get a criterion for justification of a theory as follows: our 
acceptance (or choice or revision) of a theory would be justified when the 
theory explains our sense-experience of the world better than any rival 
theory.  But this does not mean that we cannot speak of epistemic status of 
individual sentences.  From the two doctrines, we can say about 
justification of individual sentences in the following manner: for any 
sentence, our acceptance (or choice or revision) of a sentence would be 
justified when doing so contributes to some parts in a best theory about our 
sense-experience of the world.  This implies that disputes about the choice 
of language, unlike Carnap’s claim, are also theoretical matters, which are 
associated with substantial knowledge about the world.  The two doctrines 
thus demonstrate that there is no epistemic distinction between the revision 
involving language and the one without language change, and thus there is 
no distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori. 
 Some may argue that there is no place for justification in Quine’s 
naturalized epistemology.  Quine, in his later writing, “Naturalized 
Epistemology” (1969), argues that traditional epistemology, whose primary 
task is to prescribe standards to science as a whole outside of science, is to 
be abandoned; instead, we should do our study of knowledge within science 
itself.  But J. Kim (1988) criticizes that Quine’s epistemology is just a 
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purely empirical study of causal relation between sensory input and 
cognitive output, and thus, it completely rules out the study of epistemic 
normativity such as justification in epistemology.  Quine, however, does 
not agree with Kim’s characterization of his naturalism.  In other words, he 
claims that his naturalized epistemology does not imply that the study of 
epistemic normativity should be given up.  He actually says, 
 
Naturalization of epistemology does not jettison the 
normative and settle for the indiscriminate description of 
ongoing procedures.  For me normative epistemology is a 
branch of engineering. It is the technology of truth-seeking 
[..] it is matter of efficacy for an ulterior end, truth [..]  
The normative here, as elsewhere in engineering, becomes 
descriptive when the terminal parameter is expressed. 
     (Quine 1986, pp.664-65)  
 
From this, we can know that Quine regards epistemic normativity as the 
normativity of instrumental reason.  Thus, according to him, a subject’s 
revision of her belief about a theory or a sentence, etc., would be justified 
when doing so would be the effective means to her ends.  I think Quine’s 
claim that we should do our study of knowledge within science itself would 
be understood as a claim that our theoretical study of epistemic normativity 
including justification is to be informed by science, including physics, 
mathematics, psychology, and history, etc.  He simply rejects a sort of 
study, which seeks to prescribe a priori principles of epistemic normativity 
to science.  Of course, it is a controversial issue whether there is a place for 
epistemic normativity such as justification in Quine’s philosophy as a whole.  
But my concern here is not to provide a comprehensive account of how we 
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should read Quine’s whole philosophical system.  Rather, my goal here is 
to reconstruct Quine’s argument against the a priori from epistemological 
holism and underdetermination of theory by evidence, and I think that we 
can at least get a criterion for justification of a theory or a sentence from the 
two doctrines.  
 
5. What is the Distinctive Epistemic Status of Logic and 
Mathematics?  
 Carnap insisted that all substantial knowledge about the world can 
be constructed from sense-experience.  But we seem to know logical and 
mathematical theorems without any dependence on sense-experience.  That 
is, our knowledge of them seems to depend on proofs rather than 
experiments.  In this sense, logic and mathematics seem to be clearly 
different from natural science such as physics, astronomy etc.  Thus, many 
philosophers have attempted to account for this difference by introducing 
the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori.  Carnap also 
attempted to explain the difference in terms of the a priori/a posteriori 
distinction.  His attempt, as we saw, is grounded in the epistemic 
distinction between the choice of language and the choice of theory within a 
language.  But the two Quinean doctrines, epistemological holism and 
underdetermination of theory by evidence, negate this epistemic distinction.  
 The two Quinean doctrines, however, do not merely imply that 
Carnap’s attempt is not sufficient to account for the distinction between the 
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a priori and the a posteriori.  The two doctrines rather imply that every 
sentence would be justified in the same way, and thus there is no distinction 
between the a priori and the a posteriori.  Thus, logic and mathematics are 
for Quine not different in kind from other branches of knowledge such as 
physics, biology, etc.  
 
Mathematics and logic are supported by observation only in 
the indirect way that those aspects of natural science are 
supported by observation; namely as participating in an 
organized whole which, way up at its empirical edges, 
squares with observation.  I am concerned to urge the 
empirical character of logic and mathematics no more than 
the unempirical character of theoretical physics; it is rather 
their kinship that I am urging, and a doctrine of gradualism. 
                    (Quine 1966; 1976, p. 121) 
 
However, there seems to be an easily noticed seeming difference between 
them.  Quine thus needs to provide an account for the seeming difference, 
while rejecting the a priori/a posteriori distinction.  Then, what is the 
obvious seeming difference between the a priori and the a posteriori?  
Logic and mathematics, unlike almost any other sorts of knowledge, are not 
practically abandoned.  In other words, we do not in fact revise our mind 
about well-established laws of logic and mathematics even when we acquire 
some counter-examples of such laws.  
 The two Quinean doctrines can explain the practical unrevisability 
of logic and mathematics on the basis of the generality of them in our whole 
knowledge system.  Quine thinks that logic and mathematics are so deeply 
implicated with all branches of our knowledge system, and thus they are 
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indispensable in every part of a best theory about the world.  We can count 
any objects we can think of.  Logic is a study of laws about how we should 
think, and arithmetic is applied to every object that is countable.28  Thus, 
the revision of well-established logic and mathematics will result in a 
monstrous revision of every branch of our knowledge system.  This means 
that the revision requires us to abandon our whole theory of the world, and 
thus to reconstruct a totally new knowledge system from the most 
fundamental level up.  Thus, the revision of logic and mathematics will 
result in great damage, which can never be compensated by any resulting 
benefit from the revision.29  Quine thus claims that, even if we in principle 
can abandon established logic and mathematics, the revision will not happen.  
This explains why we do not practically revise our well-established logic 
and mathematics on the basis of pragmatic factors such as simplicity, 
efficiency, fruitfulness, etc.  In this way, Quine can account for the easily 
noticed difference between the supposedly a priori knowledge, in particular 
logic and mathematics and the supposedly a posteriori knowledge such as 
physics, while rejecting the principled distinction between the a priori and 
the a posteriori. 
 
 
 
                                            
28 See Frege, The Foundation of Arithmetic, pp. 20-21.  
29 See Quine, Philosophy of Logic, pp. 7, 86, 100. 
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Chapter 4 
 A Quinean Counterattack on Chalmers’ 
Critique of Quine’s Attack on the A Priori 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 In chapter 3, I discussed in detail Quine’s critique of the a priori in 
“Two Dogmas of Empiricism”.  His critique is systematically composed of 
several arguments.  One of the arguments refutes the claim that a priori 
sentences do not make an assertion about the world at all, so that they are 
held to be true no matter what, and thus they are neither confirmed nor 
disconfirmed by evidence; on the other hand, a posteriori sentences do 
make an assertion about the worlds, so that they are held to be true 
contingently on experience, and thus they are subject to confirmation or 
disconfirmation by evidence.  Therefore, the a priori is clearly 
distinguished from the a posteriori.  Quine, however, refutes this sort of 
claim on the ground of epistemological holism, which claims that every 
sentence is in principle revisable.  Epistemological holism implies that 
there are no a priori sentences which are unrevisable. 
 Some philosophers such as Carnap, Grice and Strawson, and 
Chalmers, have responded to Quine’s argument above.  They commonly 
argue that one who accepts that every sentence is in principle revisable can 
consistently hold on to the distinction between the a priori and the a 
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posteriori, on the ground that cases of revision involving language change 
(conceptual change) can be distinguished from those without language 
change (conceptual change), and the former corresponds to the a priori and 
the latter corresponds to the a posteriori.   That is, they insist that there are 
a priori sentences that are revisable.  This kind of argument is repudiated 
by the two Quinean doctrines, epistemological holism and 
underdetermination of theory by evidence. 
 Quine’s major target in “Two Dogmas” is Carnap’s conception of 
the a priori.  For Carnap, the a priori is not an unrevisable notion, that is, 
the a priori is relative to language.  He defines a priori and a posteriori 
sentences respectively in terms of revision and language change as follows: 
a sentence is a priori when the sentence is unrevisable without language 
change; a sentence is a posteriori when the sentence is revisable regardless 
of language change.  Carnap’s distinction is grounded in the epistemic 
distinction between the choice of language and the choice of theory within a 
language.  However, the two Quinean doctrines demonstrate that the 
distinction between the two revisions is useless for the a priori/a posteriori 
distinction.  The two doctrines imply that there is only one single criterion 
for justification of theories or sentences: our acceptance (or choice or 
revision) of a theory would be justified when the theory explains our sense-
experience better than any rival theory; our acceptance (or choice or 
revision) of a sentence would be justified when it contributes to some parts 
of a best theory about our sense-experience about the world.  This means 
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that every sentence would be justified in the same way.  From this, it 
follows that there is no distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori, 
and thus the distinction between revision involving language change and the 
one without language change has no epistemic significance.   
 The purpose of this chapter is twofold.  The first is to counter 
Chalmers’ argument against Quine’s attack on the a priori by arguing that 
the two Quinean doctrines demonstrate that the distinction between revision 
involving conceptual change and the one without conceptual change cannot 
be drawn, and thus Chalmers’ critique of Quine’s attack on the a priori fails.  
Not only that, I will try to show that the two doctrines would undermine a 
foundation of Chalmers’ semantic theory, epistemic two-dimensional 
semantics.  As we saw in chapter1, the distinction between the a priori and 
the a posteriori plays an absolutely crucial role in constructing his epistemic 
two-dimensional semantics, which intends to defend Fregean semantics.  
Chalmers thinks that the distinction between the a priori and the a 
posteriori mostly corresponds to the distinction between cognitive 
insignificance and cognitive significance, and moreover, he thinks that the a 
priori/a posteriori distinction is clearer than the distinction between 
cognitive insignificance and significance.  He thus attempts to construct his 
epistemic two-dimensional semantics from the distinction between the a 
priori and the a posteriori, and thereby to defend Fregean semantics.  The 
two Quinean doctrines, however, demolish the distinction between the a 
priori and the a posteriori.  This means that the two doctrines would not 
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only refute Chalmers’ critique of Quine’s attack on the a priori, but also 
Chalmers’ semantic theory. 
 I organize this chapter as follows.  In the next section, I will 
reexamine Chalmers’ critique of Quine’s attack on the a priori in chapter 2 
in light of the discussions in chapter 3.  In section 3, I will rebut Chalmers’ 
critique on the basis of the two Quinean doctrines, epistemological holism 
and underdetermination of theory by evidence.  Finally, I will show how 
the two doctrines threaten Chalmers’ epistemic two-dimensional semantics.  
 
2. Chalmers’ Rejoinder to Quine’s Attack on the A Priori  
 Quine argues against the a priori/a posteriori distinction, which 
plays a fundamental role in constructing Chalmers’ epistemic two-
dimensional semantics.   Chalmers (2011, 2012) thus attempts to refute 
Quine’s argument against the distinction between the a priori and the a 
posteriori.  He makes an attempt to draw the principled distinction 
between cases of revision involving conceptual change and those without 
conceptual change on the basis of Bayesian epistemology.  On the basis of 
this distinction, he argues that one who accepts that every sentence is in 
principle revisable is consistently able to adhere to the distinction between 
the a priori and the a posteriori.   
 Chalmers deals with Quine’s argument against the a priori in the 
final section of “Two Dogmas”.  He especially focuses on the second 
paragraph in the section.  Quine there argues that there are no a priori 
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sentences that are unrevisable.  In other words, the absolute a priori is 
repudiated by epistemological holism which implies that all sentences have 
significances for experience only when they are taken together with a theory, 
made up of logically interconnected sentences.  According to 
epistemological holism, whenever a subject has a new sense-experience, for 
any sentence S she may revise her belief about S in order to accommodate 
the new experience (Q).  Q then says that any sentence can be regarded as 
a posteriori, but no sentence can be regarded as a priori.  This means that 
we cannot distinguish a priori sentences from a posteriori sentences on the 
basis of Q. 
 Chalmers, however, claims that Q does not imply that there is no 
distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori.  That is, he insists that 
Q is compatible with the existence of a priori sentences.  
 Chalmers notes Grice and Strawson’s distinction between Q 
involving conceptual change and Q without conceptual change.30 Let’s 
consider the sentence ‘All vixens are foxes’.  Suppose that Jennifer had a 
concept <female fox> for ‘vixen’ at t1, but her concept for ‘vixen’ changed 
into <coy animal> between t1 and t2 so that her concept for ‘vixen’ was <coy 
animal> at t2; thus she ipso facto changed her mind about the sentence being 
true at t1 to being false at t2; therefore her revision can be justified solely by 
her conceptual change for ‘vixen’.  This case is an instance of Q involving 
conceptual change.  Now let’s suppose that Jennifer possessed the same 
                                            
30 See Grice and Strawson, “In Defense of a Dogma”, pp. 156-57. 
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concept <coy animal> for ‘vixen’ continuously from t1 to t2, but she revised 
her mind about the sentence in light of some evidence indicating that there 
are some disobedient vixens, so that this revision cannot be justified 
independently of sense-experience.  Then this is a case of Q without 
conceptual change.  On the basis of this distinction, we can provide a 
criterion for an a priori sentence and an a posteriori sentence respectively in 
the following manner: a sentence is a priori for a subject when her revision 
of the sentence can be justified solely by her conceptual change of the 
sentence, that is, without any dependence on sense-experience.  On the 
other hand, a sentence is a posteriori for a subject when her revision of the 
sentence cannot be justified independently of sense-experience.  From this, 
one may assert that acceptance of revisability is compatible with the 
adherence to the a priori/a posteriori distinction. 
 Chalmers agrees with the above claim.  That is, he thinks that Q is 
compatible with the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori.  
He, however, thinks that the above argument is not enough to refute Quine’s 
argument against the existence of a priori sentences which are epistemically 
distinct form a posteriori sentences.  In other words, he thinks that the 
argument cannot draw the principled distinction between Q involving 
conceptual change and Q without conceptual change which is necessary for 
the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori.  Let’s consider the 
following case: Jennifer asserted the sentence ‘All vixens are female foxes’ 
as true at t1 but false at t2 because of some psychological reason, without a 
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conceptual change of the sentence.  If her assertion is justified, then ‘All 
vixens are female foxes’ is to be a posteriori, not a priori, according to the 
above criterion.  But this is a result Chalmers would not accept.  
Chalmers thus makes an attempt to provide a criterion for the principled 
distinction between cases of Q involving conceptual change and those 
without conceptual change, and thereby argues that we can hold on to the 
distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori while accepting Q.  
 Bayesian epistemology plays an indispensable role in Chalmers’ 
critique of Quine’s attack on the a priori.  The epistemology is usually 
regarded as a good formal theory which provides a mechanism of how a 
subject revises her belief about a sentence in light of new evidence.  In this 
sense, Bayesian epistemology is regarded as a formal account of 
epistemological holism, which states that every sentence is revisable 
conditional on new evidence.  Thus, we can say that Chalmers exploits 
Bayesian epistemology, which is a formal account of epistemological holism, 
to attempt to demonstrate that Q is compatible with the distinction between 
the a priori and the a posteriori.  Bayesian epistemology is based on the 
notion of credence and the principle of conditionalization.  In the 
epistemology, for any sentences S and E, a subject can associate 
unconditional credence cr(S) and cr(E), and also associate conditional 
credence cr(S│E) at times.  The principle of conditionalization reflects the 
following intuition: If a rational subject has a credence for some sentence, S, 
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conditional on another sentence, E, at t1, i.e. conditional credence, cr1(S│E), 
and acquires total relevant evidence specified by the evidence sentence, E, 
between t1 and t2, then the subject should have an unconditional credence 
for S at t2, i.e. cr2(S), which is equal to cr1(S│E).  Chalmers also assumes 
that there is a constitutive connection between rational inference and 
conceptual continuity.  Let’s consider a rational inference rule such that for 
any sentences S and E, if E→S and E, then S.  If a subject violates this rule 
diachronically without a change in the meaning of S or E, then the subject 
would be irrational.  On the other hand, if a subject is rational, then the 
subject would be engaged in conceptual change.  On the basis of the 
principle of conditionalization and the constitutive connection between 
rational inference and conceptual continuity, Chalmers induces the principle 
of conditionalization for sentences, from which he attempts to draw the 
principled distinction between cases of Q involving conceptual change and 
those without conceptual change. Chalmers formulates the principle as 
follows:   
      
(CS) If a subject is fully rational, and if the subject acquires 
total evidence specified by E between t1 and t2, and if the 
content of sentence S does not change between t1 and t2, 
then cr2(S) = cr1(S│E).                      
                            (Chalmers 2012, p. 213) 
 
Chalmers exploits CS to provide a criterion for the principled distinction 
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between Q involving conceptual change and Q without conceptual change 
as follows: Suppose that Q holds so that for any sentence S, cr1(S)≠cr2(S).  
Let’s assume that cr1(S) is high and cr2(S) is low.  Furthermore, assume that 
a subject s is fully rational, and acquires total evidence specified by E 
between t1 and t2.  Under these assumptions, if cr1(S│E) is low, then 
cr2(S)= cr1(S│E).  This revision is a case of Q without conceptual change 
according to CS.  On the other hand, if cr1(S│E) is high, then cr2(S)≠cr1(S
│E).  Thus, according to CS, this revision falls under Q involving 
conceptual change.  Chalmers understands that the former belongs to Q 
without conceptual change and the latter belongs to Q involving conceptual 
change.  
 Chalmers attempts to draw the principled distinction between Q 
involving conceptual change and Q without conceptual change on the basis 
of CS, which is grounded in Bayesian epistemology and the constitutive 
connection between rational inference and conceptual continuity.  On the 
basis of the distinction, he argues that Q is compatible with the a priori/a 
posteriori distinction.  
 
3. A Quinean Critique of Chalmers’ Rejoinder to Quine’s 
Attack on the A Priori 
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 Chalmers makes an attempt to distinguish, in principle, cases of Q 
involving conceptual change from those without conceptual change, on the 
basis of CS which is grounded in both Bayesian epistemology and the 
existence of conceptual truths.  He then argues that cases of Q are 
compatible with the a priori/a posteriori distinction.  He in fact provides a 
criterion for a priori and a posteriori sentences respectively by using the 
notions of revision and of conceptual change.  Each criterion is as follows:  
a sentence is knowable a priori for a rational subject when her revision of 
the sentence can be justified only by her conceptual change of the sentence, 
independently of sense-experience; on the other hand, a sentence is 
knowable a posteriori when her revision of the sentence cannot be justified 
solely by her conceptual change of the sentence, that is, when justification 
of her revision requires sense-experience.  I note the fact that Chalmers’ 
distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori depends on the 
distinction between Q involving conceptual change and Q without 
conceptual change.  
 In what follows, I will provide a Quinean argument which refutes 
Chalmers’ distinction between Q involving conceptual change and Q 
without conceptual change.  In other words, I will show how the Quinean 
refutes Chalmers’ critique of Quine’s attack on the a priori, using the two 
Quinean doctrines, epistemological holism and underdetermination of 
theory by evidence.  Epistemological holism claims that evidential relation 
holds between a theory, which is a set of logically connected sentences, and 
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experience, not between an individual sentence and experience.  Or 
equivalently, we can say that epistemological holism claims that for any 
sentence S, a subject may change her mind about S in light of new evidence.  
Underdetermination of theory by evidence claims that a uniquely best theory 
is not determined only by evidence.  The doctrine rather claims that 
whenever we confront evidence, we choose a best theory on the basis of 
pragmatic factors such as convenience, expedience, fruitfulness, etc.  
 The two Quinean doctrines have the following two implications for 
epistemology.  First, the two doctrines imply that there is no unique 
relation between a theory and evidence.  Second, the two doctrines imply 
that pragmatic factors play an indispensable role in choosing a theory.  
From these implications, it follows that there is only one single criterion for 
justification of a sentence.  Our acceptance (or choice or revision) of a 
sentence would be justified when doing so contributes to some parts of a 
theory, taken as a whole, which successfully explains our sense-experience 
better than any rival theory.  This implies that there is no sentence which 
can be justified for any subject independently of sense-experience, and thus 
there is no revision of a sentence which can be justified for any subject 
without any dependence on sense-experience.  Thus, there is no case of Q 
involving conceptual change.  Therefore, the two doctrines imply that there 
is no distinction between Q involving conceptual change and Q without 
conceptual change.  
 Chalmers assumes a Bayesian epistemology that provides a formal 
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account of how a rational subject revises her belief about a sentence 
conditional on new evidence.  In this sense, Chalmers’ argument would be 
understood as an attempt to demonstrate that a priori/a posteriori distinction 
is compatible with epistemological holism, which states that every sentence 
is in principle revisable for any subject in light of new evidence.  
According to the principle of conditionalization, when a rational subject 
acquires evidence specified by E, a subject should have her new credence 
for a sentence S, i.e. cr(S), which is equal to cr1(S│E).  Someone may 
think that cr(S│E) reflects all facts about the relation between E and S so 
that E uniquely determines S, but that is not true.  Let’s suppose that S is 
the sentence ‘There is acid in the test-tube’ and E is the sentence ‘The litmus 
paper turned red when the paper was dipped into the tube’.  Then, cr(S│E) 
would be higher than cr(S) for any rational chemist.  But for some rational 
person who does not know modern chemistry at all, and trusts in 
demonology, which states that the litmus paper turns red in the presence of 
the devil, cr(S│E) would not be higher than cr(S).  It follows that the 
evidence, which indicates that the litmus paper turned red when the paper 
was dipped into the tube, does not bear upon the sentence ‘There is acid in 
the test-tube’.  Rather, the evidence bears upon a theory, such as chemistry 
or demonology, etc.  Our thought experiment also shows that evidence 
itself cannot determine a uniquely best theory, which will successfully deal 
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with our experience.  Clearly, upon observing pretty much the same thing, 
many of us will choose chemistry as the base theory, which will explain our 
observation better than demonology.  But our choice would be made on the 
basis of pragmatic factors such as predictive power, convenience, 
fruitfulness, etc.  Accordingly, Chalmers cannot refute the two Quinean 
doctrines on the basis of Bayesian epistemology.  
 Recall that Chalmers makes an attempt to draw the principled 
distinction between cases of Q involving conceptual change and those 
without conceptual change on the basis of Bayesian epistemology.  The 
epistemology, as we saw, would be regarded as a formal account of 
epistemological holism, and moreover, is compatible with 
underdetermination of theory by evidence.  But the two Quinean doctrines 
imply that there is no distinction between cases of Q involving conceptual 
change and those without conceptual change, which means that Chalmers’ 
attempt to draw the distinction is pointless.   
 Then, how can a Quinean explain facts about a subject’s revision of 
her belief about a sentence conditional on evidence?  Should the Quinean 
reject Bayesian epistemology, especially, the principle of conditionalization?  
I think that the Quinean does not need to reject the principle.  She just 
needs to amend the principle in the following manner: 
 
(QCS). If a rational subject has a credence for some 
sentence S conditional on total relevant evidence specified 
by E at t1, cr1(S│E), and acquires the evidence specified by 
E between t1 and t2, and her belief system, which is relevant 
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to S has hardly changed from t1 to t2, then cr2(S) and 
cr1(S│E) would be about the same.
31  
  
QCS is not a sophisticated formulation which reflects all facts about a 
subject’s revision of a sentence conditional on evidence.  But the Quinean 
can provide a plausible account of facts about conditional revisions by using 
QCS, together with the two Quinean doctrines, epistemological holism and 
underdetermination of theory by evidence.  Now let’s consider how the 
Quinean can account for the facts of conditional revision.   
 Case1. Let S be the sentence, ‘Water is a clear liquid that every 
human being should drink in order to maintain her existence’, and E be the 
sentence that specifies total relevant evidence indicating that there is a 
human being who does not need to drink water in order to maintain her 
existence.  Assume that the extension of ‘water’ is H2O continuously from 
t1 to t2.  Now let’s suppose that a rational biochemist, Suzie, had a high 
unconditional credence of S at t1, that is, cr1(S) was high for her on the basis 
of a best biochemistry which supports S at that time; she acquired the total 
relevant evidence that E specifies between t1 and t2; after acquiring the 
evidence, her unconditional credence of S at t2, cr2(S) was low.  In this case, 
Suzie would not revise her belief about S on the hypothetical evidence E, 
that is, cr1(S│E) would be high, because holding on to S would contribute to 
a best biochemistry about water at that time.  Since cr2(S)≠cr1(S│E), this 
case is an instance of the violation of QCS.  We assumed that Suzie is 
                                            
31 ‘QCS’ stands for ‘Quinean conditionalization for sentences’.  
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rational and she acquired the total relevant evidence that E specifies 
between t1 and t2.  Thus, we can say that the violation happens because a 
best chemistry, which is associated with water, still supports S, and 
moreover, the revision requires a drastic change of her belief system which 
is associated with S such that she has no reason which can justify the drastic 
change of her belief system.  But a rational subject, Suzie, would revise her 
belief about S after she actually acquires countervailing evidence E of S, 
because doing so would contribute to a theory, which successfully deals 
with E better than any rival theory.   
 Case2. Let S be the sentence, ‘Water is H2O’, and E be a sentence 
that specifies total relevant evidence indicating that every human being 
should drink XYZ, not H2O in order to maintain her existence.  Now let’s 
suppose that a rational business man, Tylor, who does not know advanced 
chemistry at all, had a high unconditional credence of S at t1, that is, cr1(S) 
was high for him; he acquired total relevant evidence that E specifies 
between t1 and t2, and then he had a low unconditional credence at t2, that is, 
cr2(S) was low for him.  In this case, Tylor may have a low credence of S 
conditional on E at t1, that is, cr1(S│E) may be low because he has no 
rational reason to adhere to S under the hypothesis that E is given.  Thus, if 
we suppose that cr1(S│E) is low for Tylor, then this case is compatible with 
QCS.  This means that his belief system, which is relevant to S, has hardly 
changed between t1 and t2.  In this case, a rational subject, Tylor, would 
revise her belief about S after he actually acquires countervailing evidence E 
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of S, because doing so would contribute a best theory, which copes with E 
better than any rival theory.   
  Chalmers attempts to explain the difference between case1 and 
case2 by means of the principled distinction between Q involving 
conceptual change and Q without conceptual change.  But, as we saw, the 
two Quinean doctrines imply that there are no conceptual truths, and 
therefore there is no Q involving conceptual change.  Thus, we need to 
explain the difference between case1 and case2 in another way.  A Quinean 
can give a required account.  According to the Quinean, case1 would be an 
instance of a rational subject’s revision of her belief about a sentence, due to 
the drastic change of the subject’s belief system, which is relevant to the 
sentence; on the other hand, case2 would be an instance of a rational 
subject’s revision of her belief about a sentence, with very little change of 
the subject’s belief system, which is relevant to the sentence.    
 To sum up, the two Quinean doctrines, epistemological holism and 
underdetermination of theory by evidence, demonstrate that the distinction 
between cases of Q involving conceptual change and those without 
conceptual change cannot be drawn, and thus Chalmers’ attempt fails to 
refute Quine’s argument against the distinction between the a priori and the 
a posteriori.  But my argument does not merely claim that the two Quinean 
doctrines imply that Chalmers’ attempt is not sufficient to warrant the 
possibility of the distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori.  As 
we saw, the two Quinean doctrines are compatible with Bayesian 
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epistemology, which plays an absolutely crucial role in Chalmers’ critique 
of Quine’s attack on the a priori.  However, the two doctrines imply that 
there is no distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori; therefore, 
Chalmers’ attempt fails.  Epistemological holism, taken with 
underdetermination of theory by evidence, implies that no sentence would 
be epistemically different, and thus any attempt to draw the distinction 
between the a priori and the a posteriori is useless.   
 
4. A Quinean Doubt about a Fundamental Assumption of 
Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics  
 In the previous section, I demonstrated that the two Quinean 
doctrines, epistemological holism and underdetermination of theory by 
evidence, imply that our acceptance (or choice or revision) of a sentence 
would be justified in the same way, and thus the supposed distinction 
between Q involving conceptual change and Q without conceptual change 
cannot be drawn.  Therefore, Chalmers’ argument, which aims to 
demonstrate that Q is compatible with the a priori/a posteriori distinction, 
fails.  
 The two Quinean doctrines, however, do not merely refute 
Chalmers’ critique of Quine’s attack on the a priori.  The two doctrines 
would be a threat to Chalmers’ semantic theory, epistemic two-dimensional 
semantics.  The distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori plays 
a foundational role in constructing Chalmers’ epistemic two-dimensional 
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semantics.  The two doctrines, however, imply that no sentence would be 
different from epistemic point of view, and thus there is no distinction 
between the a priori and the a posteriori.  
 Chalmers’ epistemic two-dimensional semantics aims to defend 
Fregean semantics.  A distinctive common feature of all sorts of Fregean 
semantics is a claim that our cognitive significance of an expression is 
reflected in its meaning, and thus the cognitive difference of two 
expressions are reflected in the difference of meanings of the two 
expressions.  As Frege noted in “On Sinn and Bedeutung”, an expression’s 
extension cannot play a role which is associated with cognitive significance.  
I believe that the sentence ‘George Orwell is George Orwell’ is true, but I 
might not believe that the sentence ‘George Orwell is Eric Blair’ is true even 
though two names, ‘George Orwell’ and ‘Eric Blair’, have the same 
extension, George Orwell.  Thus, if an expression’s meaning is exhausted 
by its extension, then the cognitive difference of the two names cannot be 
explained by means of the difference in meaning of the two names.  Frege, 
however, thought that when we come to know that the sentence, ‘George 
Orwell is Eric Blair’, our knowledge depends on what we mean by ‘George 
Orwell’ and by ‘Eric Blair’.  He thus suggested that there is an aspect of 
meaning, what he calls ‘sense’, which is constitutively connected to 
cognitive significance such that an expression’s sense plays a role in 
knowledge and in inference.  Chalmers agrees with Frege’s idea that there 
is an aspect of meaning which has cognitive significance.  But he thinks 
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that Frege’s notions of sense and cognitive significance are somewhat 
unclear.  Many philosophers have thought, if a sentence is trivially 
knowable for a subject, that is, the sentence is cognitively insignificant, then 
the sentence is knowable a priori for the subject.  In other words, many 
philosophers have thought that cognitive (in)significance are closely related 
to the a priori (a posteriori).  Chalmers adopts this idea, and he also thinks 
that the notion of apriority is clear and thus the distinction between the a 
priori and the a posteriori is also clear.  He thus attempts to construct 
epistemic intension, what he calls ‘primary intension’, from the a priori/a 
posteriori distinction.  But the two Quinean doctrines imply that there is no 
distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori.  Therefore, the two 
doctrines can be understood to refute not only Chalmers’ rejoinder to 
Quine’s attack on the a priori, but also Chalmers’ epistemic two-
dimensional semantics, which is a semantic theory aiming to defend 
Fregean semantics.  
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Conclusion  
 
 
Let me review what I have discussed so far.  Chalmers’ epistemic two-
dimensional semantics is understood as a defense of Fregean semantics, 
which claims that every expression has ‘sense’, a sort of meaning which is 
associated with knowledge.  Chalmers’ epistemic two-dimensional 
semantics aims to defend Fregean semantics, while accommodating 
meaning externalism by vindicating that every expression not only has 
‘secondary intension’, which is associated with a role in explaining its 
extensions or its truth-conditions, but also has ‘primary intension’, which is 
associated with roles in its cognitive significance and in determining its 
extension. 
 However, many contemporary philosophers who are sympathetic to 
meaning externalism have taken a skeptical stance about the existence of 
primary intensions, and have provided several critiques of Chalmers’ 
epistemic two-dimensional semantics.  Thus, it is paramount for Chalmers 
to define the primary intension in such a way that the intension is 
invulnerable to the meaning externalists’ criticism.  He thus attempts to 
define the primary intension which is constitutively connected to cognitive 
significance.  It seems plausible that if a sentence is trivially knowable 
(cognitively insignificant), then the sentence is knowable a priori.  Thus, it 
seems plausible that the difference between cognitive insignificance and 
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significance is strongly associated with the distinction between the a priori 
and the a posteriori.  Moreover, the notions of a priori and a posteriori 
seem clear.  Chalmers (2012) thus sets out to provide a foundation for an 
adequate definition of primary intensions on the basis of the distinction 
between the a priori and the a posteriori.  In other words, he attempts to 
vindicate the A Priori Scrutability thesis, which claims that any rational 
subject would be in a position to know all true sentences from a very limited 
class of true sentences, without any dependence on sense-experience.  He 
then exploits the thesis to define primary intension which reflects the 
distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori.  
 However, Quine (1953; 1980) powerfully argues that there is no 
distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori.  Chalmers 
understands Quine’s argument against the a priori as a claim that a priori 
sentences, if they exist, are to be unrevisable; but every sentence is in 
principle revisable (revisability).  Therefore, there is no distinction 
between the a priori and the a posteriori.  Against this, Chalmers argues 
that one who accepts revisability also consistently can adhere to the 
distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori.  That is, he claims 
that there are a priori sentences that are revisable.  He employs Bayesian 
epistemology to draw the principled distinction between revisability 
involving conceptual change and one without conceptual change.  The 
former states that there are sentences whose revision is justified solely by 
conceptual change of the sentences, and thus they are justified 
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independently of sense-experience.  On the other hand, the latter states that 
there are sentences whose revision requires empirical matters.  From this, 
he argues that this distinction is compatible with the distinction between the 
a priori and the a posteriori.  He therefore argues that Quine’s argument 
fails to show that revisability implies that there is no distinction between the 
a priori and the a posteriori.  
 In my thesis, I have argued that Chalmers’ attempt is unsuccessful.  
Quine, in “Two Dogmas”, suggests two doctrines, epistemological holism 
and underdetermination of theory by evidence.  On the basis of these two 
doctrines, we can construct a Quinean argument which not only refutes 
Chalmers’ response to Quine’s attack on the a priori, but also Chalmers’ 
semantic theory.  Epistemological holism states that the evidential relation 
does not hold between an individual sentence and experience, but holds 
between a theory which is composed of logically interconnected sentences, 
and experience.  Underdetermination of theory by evidence states that 
there is no uniquely best theory which is determined solely by evidence.  
These two doctrines imply that there is just only one single criterion for 
justification of theories or sentences.  Acceptance (or choice or revision) of 
a theory would be justified when the theory successfully explains our sense-
experience about the world better than any rival theory; acceptance (or 
choice or revision) of a sentence would be justified when doing so 
contributes to a best theory or our sense-experience about the world.  From 
this, it follows that there is no sentence which can be justified for any 
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subject without any dependence on sense-experience, and thus there is no 
revision of a sentence which can be justified for any subject independently 
of sense-experience. Thus, the two Quinean doctrines imply that there is no 
distinction between Q involving conceptual change and Q without 
conceptual change, and thus Chalmers’ critique of Quine’s attack on the a 
priori fails.  Furthermore, the two doctrines attack Chalmers’ epistemic 
two-dimensional semantics itself.  The a priori/a posteriori distinction 
plays a fundamentally important role in constructing Chalmers’ epistemic 
two-dimensional semantics.  The two doctrines, however, imply that no 
sentence would be different from the epistemological point of view, and thus 
there is no distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori.  In this 
sense, my thesis can be regarded as providing a critique not only of 
Chalmers’ rejoinder to Quine’s attack on the a priori, but also of Chalmers’ 
epistemic two-dimensional semantics.  
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국문 초록 
 
 
 이 논문의 목적은 데이비드 차머스가 제시한 인식적 이차원주의 
의미론에 대한 콰인주의적 비판을 제공하는 것이다. 다시 말해서, 나는 
그의 의미론이 근본적으로 의존하고 있는 선험/후험 구분에 대해 
콰인주의적 비판을 제공함으로써, 그의 의미론을 비판한다.  
 1장에서 나는 프레게주의 의미론으로써 제안된 차머스의 인식적 
이차원주의 의미론과 그의 의미론에서 선험성의 역할에 대해서 논의한다. 
나는 차머스의 기획 즉, 프레게의 의미론을 옹호하는 기획이 성공하기 
위해서는 프레게의 뜻 에 준하는 역할을 하는 일차내포가 정의되어야 하며, 
일차내포의 정의는 선험/후험 구분이 존재할 때에만 가능함을 논증한다.   
 2장에서 나는 선험성에 대한 콰인의 공격에 대해 차머스가 한 
대응을 검토한다. 차머스가 이해한 콰인의 공격에 따르면, 모든 문장은 
수정될 수 있고 (수정가능성), 따라서 선험/후험 구분은 존재하지 않는다. 
콰인의 논증에 반대해서, 차머스는 개념변화를 포함하는 수정가능성과 
개념변화를 포함하지 않는 수정가능성 사이의 원칙적인 구분을 긋는 
시도를 한다. 그리고 이 구분에 근거해서 그는 수정가능성은 선험/후험 
구분과 양립가능하며, 따라서 선험성에 대한 콰인의 공격은 실패함을 
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논증한다.   
 3장에서 나는 카르납의 선험성 개념 즉, 언어에 상대화된 선험성 
개념에 대해서 “경험주의의 두 독단”에서 콰인이 제시한 비판을 면밀히 
검토한다. 나는 카르납식의 선험/후험 구분은 콰인의 인식론적 전체론과 
증거에 의한 이론의 과소결정성 논제에 의해서 논박됨을 논증한다.  
 4장에서 나는 선험성에 대한 콰인의 공격에 대해 차머스가 한 
대응과 차머스의 의미론에 대한 콰인주의적 비판을 제공한다. 인식론적 
전체론은 증거에 의한 이론의 과소결정 논제와 함께 선험/후험 구분이 
존재하지 않음을 함축한다. 이 함축에 근거해서, 나는 차머스의 대응이 
실패함을 보이며 또한 그의 의미론을 논박한다.   
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